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I. INTRODUCTION
As with every other remnant' throughout history, forced heirship exists but as
a mere shadow of its former self. A noble, distinguished institution that once
served as legal recognition of family solidarity and members' contribution to the
enterprise of intergenerational prosperity' was reduced in 1996 to a proxy for
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1. Remnant is a biblical term. The word appears in St. Paul's letter to the Romans 11:5-6: "So,
too, at the present time there is a remnant chosen by grace. And if by grace, then it is no longer by
works; if it were. grace would no longer be grace." The New International Version (NIV) of the Bible
explains as follows: "Remnant. As it was in Elijah's day, so it was in Paul's day. Despite widespread
apostasy. a faithful remnant of Jews remained, chosen by grace. The grounds for the existence of the
remnant was not their good works but God's grace."
Interestingly, Justice Dennis in Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1171 (La. 1993), used the
same term to describe the legislation passed in 1989 and 1990 and declared unconstitutional in the
Lauga case: "Instead, they (proponents of the legislation's constitutionality] contend that the law does
not abolish forced heirship because the legislature saw fit to leave intact a vestigal remnant of the
former legal institution"(emphasis added). He summarized the arguments of the appellants as "[i]f there
was any restriction on legislative power to alter the system... it would have been satisfied by any
remnant the legislature deemed appropriate that plausibly could have been called 'forced heirship.''Id.
at 1163 (emphasis added).
See also Katherine Connell-Thouez, The New Forced Heirship in Louisiana: Historical
Perspectives, Comparative Law Analyses and Reflections upon the Integration of New Structures Into
a Classical Civil Law System, 43 Loy. L Rev. 1 (1997).
2. See Katherine S. Spaht et al., What Has Become of Forced Heirship, 45 La. L Rev. 575. 591-
95 (1984). See also Connell-Thouez, supra note 1 at 17:
Successions law is in many respects a subset, although a vezy important one, of the larger
area of the law of the family. The close historical links between the areas of family law and
successions law have had the effect of creating and maintaining a social structure that was
and, in some cases, still is based upon the traditional family.
In modem times this type of protection [patrimonial stability to children of a marriage]
is extremely important. Present day solutions of parental authority and alimentary pensions
are quite inadequate to compensate for emotional and economic upheaval and insecurity
when the family unit, be it traditional or alternative, is dissolved. The institutions of
successions law offer protection potentially to all children irrespective of the number of
marriages of a parent.
Id. at 23. See generally Joseph Dainow, Forced Heirship in French Law. 2 La. L. Rev. 669 (1940);
Joseph Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship: Its History in Texas and Louisiana, 4 La. L
Rev. 42 (1941).
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support for the most vulnerable children-those younger than twenty-four or
permanently incapable of caring for themselves or administering their property?
Nonetheless, the remnant, a reminder of Louisiana's rich and diverse legal
heritage,4 does remain and continues to serve the state's citizens,5 not only by
providing support for the vulnerable children who receive their legitime but also
by relieving the entire citizenry of that obligation.
This article examines the two categories of vulnerable children in an effort to
identify the "core concept" of the new forced heirship. Isolating the "core concept"
determines, in effect, the parameters of the Louisiana constitutional provision on
forced heirship' and serves as an evaluative tool for judging the constitutionality
of legislation implementing the concept. This article also critiques recentjurisprudence interpreting the implementing and interrelated legislation, including
the Civil Code article that defines one category of forced heir as those descendants
who are permanently incapable of caring for their persons or administering their
estates.7 Even though the Civil Code articles governing a testator's capacity and
undue influence were enacted before the implementing legislation, they are
intricately related to the dramatic reduction in forced heirship, which previously
had protected all children of the decedent regardless of the child's age or
condition.8 One court of appeal decision interpreting these new articles on undue
3. LA. Civ. Code art. 1493.
4. The institution of forced heirship existed in Louisiana for almost two hundred years. See
Connell-Thouez, supra note I at 11. "Elements of this institution have come to us from Roman law via
the Spanish law as well as from the Coutume de Paris and the Code Napoleon. The Louisiana Digest
of 1808 and the Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870 provided protection for heirs. Since 192 1, the institution
has been enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution." Id. at 6. See also other authorities cited supra, note
2.
See generally Frederick W. Swaim & Kathryn V. Lorio, Successions and Donations, in 10 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1995); and Katherine S. Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A
Regrettable "Revolution," 50 La. L Rev. 409 (1990) and authorities cited therein,
5. Kathryn V. Lorio, Forced Heirship: The Citadel Has Fallen-Or Has It? 44 La. B.J. 16, 19(1996): "[Ihe citadel of forced heirship is certainly difficult to recognize for those who remember the
majestic fortress in its prime. Although renovation is generally contemplated to preserve and improve
a structure, that has hardly been the case with forced heirship in Louisiana."
See also Succession of Boyter, No. 99-C-0761, 2000 WL 21267 (La. Jan. 7, 2000).
6. La. Const. art. XI1. § 5. See Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993), discussed
supra, note 1.
"Because the nature and goals of the 'new forced heirship' are different from those of the classical
institution, this new concept will be applied and interpreted differently." Connell-Thouez, supra note
1, at 40. "There is little doubt that the 'new forced heirship' was conceived as an extension beyond
death of the alimentary obligation to needy children and grand-children.... [Allthough it is a good
thing to protect children in need, this institution is no longer the classical institution of forced heirship
that we have known. It does not provide equal and certain intergenerational economic support to the
family.... Quite the opposite, it provides alimentary support to individuals on the basis of proven
need. Id. at 39.
7. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (A), (C).
8. As has been previously documented, at the time of the enactment of the legislation in 1989
and 1990 eiminating the protection of forced heirship for all children, the proscription against evidence
of captation in La. Civ. Code art. 1492 was repealed. In fact the repeal was contained in the same Act.
See 1989 La. Acts No. 788; 1990 La. Acts No. 147. The repeal of the proscription recognized that
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influence, which involved litigation alleging undue influence by the surviving
spouse and second wife of the testator, will be critically examined; the Louisiana
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, but the parties settled the case before
it was argued.9
With the inadvertent repeal in 1997 of the series of Civil Code articles on
disinherison 0 and the failure of the Louisiana Legislature to enact new articles in
1999 before their effective repeal on July 1, 1999,"1 can a parent still disinherit a
forced heir, and if so, for what reasons? The Louisiana constitutional provision
concerning forced heirship mentions disinherison; thus, understanding the context
in the which the Constitution mentions disinherison against the background of the
"core concept" of forced heirship assists in resolving the issue of what, if any,
grounds for disinherison exist after July 1, 1999: none, the old grounds, or any
grounds that the proponents of the will can persuade the judge are "just"?3
Increasing recognition of the devastation wrought by divorce 4 and the effect
without the protection of forced heirship children of the decedent had to be permitted to prove undue
influence on the testator, just as children in all other "common law" jurisdictions are permitted to do.
See Spaht et al.. supra note 4.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (1993), declared the two acts
unconstitutional. However, in the meantime on recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute
a revision of the Civil Code articles on capacity passed. 1991 La. Acts No. 363. The Act included a
specific article, La. Civ. Code art. 1479, which attempted to define undue influence and permitted an
action to declare a donation inter vivos or mortis causa null because of such influence; another article
in the same chapter provided for the applicable standard of persuasion. La. Civ. Code art. 1483.
9. Succession of Reeves, 704 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997), writ granted, 1998 WL
231431 (La. May 1. 1998).
The author, with the assistance of Professors Cynthia Samuel of Tulane University Law School and
Kathryn Lorio of Loyola University Law School, submitted an amici brief to the court, which is on file
with the author (no compensation was received by us; in fact, we paid the filing fee). The brief posits
that a spouse can exercise undue influence on the testator based upon the legislative history of the repeal
of La. Civ. Code art. 1492 in 1989 and the enactment of La. Civ. Code art. 1479 in 1991. The
legislature repealed the proscription of proving undue influence with the surviving spouse who is a
stepparent of children of the testator clearly in mind.
10. 1997 La. Acts No. 1421, § 1: "Chapter 6 of Title U of Book Ill of the Civil Code, formerly
comprising Civil Code Arts. 1570 through 1723, are hereby amended and reenacted to comprise Arts.
1570 through 1616 ..." Within Civil Code arts. 1570 through 1616 as reenacted effective July 1, 1999
(Section 11 of Act No. 1421), there are no articles on disinherison which previously appeared in
Articles 1617-1624.
11. See infra notes 105- I18 for discussion of legislative history of two bills introduced during
the 1999 legislative session.
12. ia. Const. art. XII, § 5, (B): "The amount of the forced portion reserved to heirs and the
grounds for disinherison shall also be provided by law."
13. See discussion infra notes 127-129.
14. Maggie Gallagher, The Abolition of Marriage: How We Destroy Lasting Love 123 (1996);
Paul R. Amato & Alan Booth, A Generation at Risk: Growing Up in an Era of Family Upheaval 238
(1997); Glen S. Stanton. Why Marriage Matters: Reasons to Believe in Marriage in Post-Modem
Society (1997).
See also Katherine S. Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal
Implications, 59 La. L. Rev. 63, 75 (1998).
The soon to be released report by Patrick Fagan entitled The Effects of Divorce on Children and
Society: Why Policy Makers Should End Easy Divorce for Parents of Young Children, (2000)
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of remarriage on children of divorce" necessitates a reexamination of the
stepparent's usufruct over the forced heir's legitime. This article first considers the
extant social science literature and that of related disciplines about stepparent-
stepchild relationships and then brings that information to bear upon the
assumptions the law makes about the use of the income produced from the legitime.
The legal assumptions of 1982 when the usufruct over the legitime was extended
for the first time to a stepparent 6 to permit a testator to take advantage of changes
in federal estate tax advantages 7 may have been reasonable; after all, the vast
majority of forced heirs were adult, able-bodied children of the decedent and thelegitime constituted legal recognition that property acquired by a parent was in
essence "family" property."' However, the "core concept" of forced heirship has
changed, and the only forced heirs are vulnerable children in need of a readily
accessible means of support. Is it reasonable for the law to assume that the
stepparent will use the income for the needs of the stepchild? Is it constitutional
for the legislature to create, or to permit the testator to create, a usufruct over the
legitime, 9 considering the "core concept" of forced heirship? This article explores
the unfinished business of the stepparent's usufruct over the legitime, unfinished
because the legislature has not had the opportunity to fully consider its continuation
in light of the new "core concept" of forced heirship.
Although the right of a descendant to a forced share can no longer be invoked
against a majority of decedents' estates in Louisiana, the right continues to exist for
some children. It continues to exist for very important reasons-principally, for theprotection of our most vulnerable children, but also for the benefit of all Louisiana
citizens. Understanding the present circumscribed purpose of the legitie fosters an
appreciation of the institution and, from a broader perspective, how insuring
protection for the most vulnerable citizens on moral grounds also serves the general
public's interest. Why shouldn't the parent who is morally and legally obligated to
care for his needy child throughout his life' be restricted in a minimal way fromdisinheriting that child at death? The parent is no longer in need of his property, and
the child should be the primary responsibility of the parent, not the public.
II. THE REMAINING REMNANT
A. Constitutional "Core Concept" of Forced Heirship
The legislature shall provide for the classification of descendants of the
first degree, twenty-three years of age or younger as forced heirs. The
observes: "Divorce is hurting American children very badly. Therefore, state officials should repeal
domestic laws that provide for easy divorce."
15. See discussion of literature from the fields of social science, sociobiology, and evolutionary
psychology in text at notes infra notes 130-175.
16. 1982 La. Acts No. 445, § 1 (1982).
17. See discussion infra notes 193-197.
18. See Spaht, supra note 2, at 591-95.
19. La. Civ. Code arts. 890, 1499.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 229.
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legislature may also classify as forced heirs descedants of any age who,
because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking
care of their.persons or administering their estates .... 21
In Succession of Lauga2 the Louisiana Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of an act revising the classification of forced heirs;" at the time
the Louisiana Constitution prohibited legislation abolishing forced heirship.' To
determine whether the legislation violated the proscription the court focused on the
"core principle" of forced heirship, which included the following dimensions: (1)
each child has an individual right to an equal share of the forced portion of his
parent's estate; (2) each child inherits equally with his siblings the forced portion
of his parent's estate; and (3) the state protects against the evil of unjust
disinherison of children, "which leads to family disharmony and litigation among
siblings and the concentration of family estates in fewer than all the children, to the
economic detriment of society and the resulting impoverishment of the disinherited
children."" The Louisiana Supreme Court held the legislation unconstitutional
because it abolished "the legal institution of forced heirship with respect to all of
its ends and purposes as effectively as would a simple repeal of all forced heirship
laws."26
Reversing the constitutional proscription, Article XII, § 5 abolished forced
heirship, effective January 1, 1996,27 "except as provided in.. . ." the language
quoted above. Therefore, it is evident that the core principle of forced heirship, the
remaining remnant, differs markedly from its predecessor. The first sentence
endorsed by the people of the State of Louisiana phrased in mandatory terms
directs the legislature to provide that descendants of the first degree twenty-three
years of age or younger be forced heirs. Forced heirs, as understood historically
and at the time the amendment was passed, assures that those descendants so
classified will be reserved a portion of their parent's estate at death. The amount
21. La. Const. an. XiG, § 5 (B) (1995) (emphasis added). This constitutional provision became
operative on November 23, 1995, but became effective on January 1, 1996, by virtue of the
implementing legislation, 1995 La. Acts No. 1180. See Katherine S. Spaht. Forced Heirship Changes:
Regrettable "Revolution" Completed, 57 La. L Rev. 55, 66-68 (1996).
22. 624So.2dll56(La. 1993).
23. 1989 La. Acts No. 788; 1990 La. Acts No. 147.
24. La. Const. art. X11, § 5 (1974): "No law shall abolish forced heirship. The determination of
forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for disinherison shall be provided by
law."
25. ld.at1158.
26. Id. "In construing a constitutional provision, the courts may consider the object sought to
be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied, in light of
the history of the times and the conditions and circumstances under which the provision was framed."
Id. at 1160.
See generally John Devlin, Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana State Constitution:
Could Roe v. Wade Be Alive and Well in the Bayou State, 51 La. L Rev. 685, 689-90 (1991).
27. See supra note 21. See also Succession of Boyter, No. 99-C-0761, 2000 WL 21267 (La. Jan.
7,2000).
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of the forced portion may be fixed by the legislature28 "[s]ubject to and not
inconsistent with" 29 the institution's basic precepts. If, as Justice Dennis opined,
"[t]he function of the court, in construing a constitutional provision, is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the people who adopted it,",* what was the intent of
the people in 1995 in adopting the directive that descendants under twenty-four
years of age be forced heirs? What was "the purpose of the constitutional
provision and the interests it furthers and resolves"?3' The second sentence of the
same constitutional provision permits the legislature to classify as forced heirs
"descendants of any age [and any degree] who, because of mental incapacity or
physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons or administering
their estates." This sentence can assist in identifying the "core principle" of forced
heirship and what the people intended.
The core principle of the new forced heirship obviously includes:
(1) the effective provision of support for needy incapable children
through the mechanism of a fixed share of their deceased parent's
estate, which
(2) combats the evil of unjust disinherison of such children,
(3) relieves the people collectively of the responsibility of maintaining
such children through the use of public funds, and
(4) provides certainty as to the amount due the child (a sum certain)
which has the effect of reducing litigation and encouraging
settlement.32
Furthermore, the second sentence permitting, but not mandating, the legislature to
classify incapable descendants as forced heirs was probably understood by the
people of Louisiana as protecting another category of the most vulnerable of our
citizens by exacting a small portion of the parent's estate for the child's support.
In other words, the people undoubtedly failed to read the small print of the
proposition and assumed that vulnerable children most in need would be protected
from unjust disinherison; only adult, able-bodied children would no longer be the
beneficiaries of a reserved portion of their parent's estate. These conclusions have
consequences.
28. "The amount of the forced portion reserved to heirs... shall also be provided by law ......
La. Const. art. Xlf, § 5.
29. Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156.1158 (1993).
30. Id. at 1164.
31. Id. "Because the question is how the constitution was understood by the people adopting it,
not merely how it was viewed by the drafters ......
32. Mary A. Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession
Law, 60 Tul. L Rev. 1165 (1986).
See generally Kerry J. Miller, The New Forced Heirship Law, Its Implementing Legislation, and
Major Substantive Policy Changes of the Louisiana State Law Institute's Proposed Comprehensive
Revision of the Successions and Donations Law, 71 Tul. L Rev. 223 (1996); Amy S. Poling, Protecting
the Interests of Children of Divorce: A Proposal to Create Exceptions to the Louisiana Prohibition
Against Contracting for Future Successions. 72 Tul. L Rev. 1853 (1998).
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B. Meaning of Permanently Incapable
Despite the Louisiana State Law Institute's recommendation to the contrary,
the legislature chose to include incapable descendants within the classification of
forced heirs considering "the potential economic impact of eliminating incapable
descendants from the category of forced heirs and anticipated taxpayer indignation
about bearing the cost of care for such children so that the parent could dispose of
his own property after he died to other people or organizations."3
The protected descendants must be "permanently" incapable of caring for their
persons or administering their estates, language, which absent "permanently,"
constitutes the statutory formulation for limited interdiction.3 As has been
discussed elsewhere, the adverb "permanently" in Civil Code article 1493"5
modifies incapable and refers to the duration, not extent of the incapacity,36 even
though some of the original language of comment (c)" drafted after legislative
33. Katherine S. Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The "Regrettable Revolution" Completed,
57 La. L Rev. 55, 86-87 (1996).
Essentially, the legislators accepted the view that certainty for those who are sophisticated
enough to seek assistance in estate planning is not the only societal value to be weighed in
the calculation. Uncertainty, to some extent, always exists: a person does not know whether
he will die before or after each of his children reaches the age of twenty-four. The described
uncertainties which can never be eliminated absolutely had to be weighed against the plight
of descendants who would have no protection from unwarranted disinherison and be left
either bereft of resources or as the taxpayers' responsibility, or both. This argument,
moreover, does not even consider the moral responsibility of the parent.
Id. at 87.
34. La. Civ. Code art. 389.1.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (A): "Forced heirs are descendants of the first degree who, at the time
of the death of the decedent, are twenty-three years of age or younger or descendants of the first degree
of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently incapable of taking
care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of the death of the decedent."
36. Spaht, supra note 33, at 91-94. "Thus, when the Revised Comments refer to the extent of
the incapacity to care for one's self or to administer one's property, the comments do not constitute an
accurate description of the statutory language ... ." Id at 92 (emphasis added).
37. Concern was expressed, too, that the broad scope of the terms might encourage
spurious claims for relatively minor incapacities or infirmities, and also concerning the
uncertainty whethera temporary, albeit severe, incapacity or infirmity might qualify a child
as a forced heir.... More important, the Legislature added the word "permanently" before
the word "incapable" for the express purpose of emphasizing that a temporary incapacity
or infirmity, even if severe, should not apply.
La. Civ. Code art. 1493, cmt. (c) (emphasis added).
The legislature thereby expressly manifested its intent that the rule making disabled
children of any age forced heirs should only apply to "seriously handicapped" individuals.
The Legislature requested specifically that these Comments be written to explain that it
is the purpose of adding the word "permanently" to more effectively express the public
policy intended, namely, to protect children who are over the age of 23 as forced heirs, if,
and only if they are severely disabled.
Succession of Martinez, 729 So. 2d 22, 23-24 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999). "Although the jurisprudence
on limited interdiction may be helpful, the new rule expressed in this Article is intentionally different
and more restrictive than the standard for interdiction because of the use of the word 'permanently' to
describe the nature of the incapacity." La. Civ. Code art. 1493, cmt. (c) (emphasis added).
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passage suggested to the contrary." In 1998 the legislature by resolution directed
the Law Institute to change the comment because the comment "incorrectly
characterizes permanently incapable children by terms not included within the
article as enacted by the legislature, such as 'severely disabled' and 'seriously
handicapped' and thereby purports to limit the category of incapable children as
defined by the legislature... .0' Even the yearly edition of the Louisiana Civil
Code published by West Publishing Company contained an Editor's Note to the
following effect:
The legislature directed the Louisiana State Law Institute to edit the 1996
Revision Comment (c) under Article 1493 by deleting "all references
describing incapable children in terms other than those used in that article,
to-wit: children who are 'permanently incapable of caring for their
persons or administering their estates' and instruct West Publishing
Company to reprint the Comment (c), as edited."I
38. See discussion in Spaht, supra note 33 at 91-94. "The paragraph of the Revised Comment
that follows the onequoted above [see supra note 371 belies the interpretation of intent of the
Legislature in adding the word permanently. . . . This paragraph recognizes and supports the
proposition that 'pennanently' does not address the extent of the incapacity but only its duration.
Therefore, references in the preceding paragraph of the Revised Comment, to severe and seriously
handicapped that were not considered at the time the bill was heard find no support in the statutory
language. Furthermore, comments are not the law." Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
In the new Editor's Note in the yearly published Civil Code (Special Milleinium Edition by West
Publishing Co.), there is reference to the comments: "Article 1493 was amended by La. Acts 1996, No.
77, § 1 (I st Extraordinary Session) with revision comments. The original revision comments, however,
were modified by the Louisiana State Law Institute after the amendment of Article 1493 and the
publication of Act no. [sic] 77 in the Session Laws Service .... 290(2000).
39. H.C.R. 1 1998 Extraordinary Session:
WHEREAS, the term "permanently" as used in Civil Code Article 1493 relates to
duration of the incapacity; and
WHEREAS, the phrase "incapable of caring for his person or administering his property"
relates to the extent of his incapacity; and
WHEREAS, the terms "disabled" and "handicapped" are terms not adopted by the
legislature and not necessarily coextensive with the standard "incapable of caring for his
person or administering his property"; and
WHEREAS, as a consequence, portions of comment (c) to Civil Code Article 1493 are
not consistent with the provisions of the article as enacted by the legislature....
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Legislature of Louisiana hereby directs the
Louisiana State Law Institute to instruct West Publishing Company to reprint the Revision
Comments of 1996 to Civil Code Article 1493 (comment (c)) by deleting all references
describing such incapable children in terms other than those used in the article, to wit:
children who are "permanently incapable of caring for their persons or administering their
estates."
(emphasis added).
40. Editor's Note, La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (1999 edition). The reference to House Resolution
No. I (1998 Extraordinary Session) does not appear in the Editor's Note of the Special Millenium
Edition of the Louisiana Civil Code (2000), but it does contain a reference to a partial history of the
comments. See supra note 38.
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Nonetheless, in Succession of Martinez4 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal,
without citing the 1998 Resolution, relied on Comment (c) before it was edited to
deny a "permanently" incapable descendant his forced portion of his mother's
estate. Just as anticipated by the legislature in the Resolution, the comment was
cited as authority to limit the category of incapable children who are forced heirs:
The trial judge found that to be mentally incapable within the meaning of
art. 1493, the person must be "severely handicapped." She cited the
comments to the article in the third paragraph of Comments (c), relying
on that part which states: ". . . The legislature thereby expressly
manifested its intent that the rule making disabled children of any age
forced heirs should only apply to 'seriously handicapped' individuals.
The Legislature requested specifically that these Comments be written to
explain that it is the purpose of adding the word 'permanently' to more
effectively express the public policy intended; namely, to protect children
who, are over the age of 23 as forced heirs if, and only if, they are
severely disabled."42
In affirming the decision of the trial judge, the court of appeal also relied upon the
language in comment (c) describing incapable forced heirs as only those who are
"severely handicapped." As the thirty-three year old child was only mildly
handicapped mentally and not "severely" handicapped, he was not a forced heir,
"even though he is incapable of taking care of certain aspects of his life without
assistance. '
By the court's own admission, the child "has difficulty with money
transactions, banking, and he cannot perform more than one task at a time." His
relatives, including the brother with whom the child lived, helped him with all of
his banking tasks, keeping appointments, and purchasing groceries and other
necessities. Someone, the brother with whom the child lived or a friend in the
brother's absence, was required to stay with the child at all times: "Although
plaintiff [the child] held a job for a short time some years in the past, he is
unemployable."4 s The court after reciting such facts then added, as if relevant, that
41. 729 So. 2d 22 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999).
42. Id. at 23-24
43. Id. at 24:
La. C. C. art. 1493 states that, in order to become a forced heir after the age of 23, the
person must be permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their
estates. The comments indicate that the intent of the legislature was to provide this remedy
only for "severely handicapped" persons. Based on the evidence, plaintiff is considered
mildly mentally handicapped, even though he is incapable of taking care of certain aspects
of his life without assistance. Consequently, since he is not "severely" handicapped, we
find that the trial judge did not err in finding that plaintiff is not a forced heir under La. C.C.
art. 1493.
(emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. id.
He receives Social Security disability income and is enrolled in the U.S. Navy's
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the "[p]laintiff does not consider himself severely handicapped and is socially
active." 6 Regardless of the opinion of the thirty-three year old mentally retarded
child, he was clearly incapable of administering his estate and his incapacity was
permanent, not temporary; he was a forced heir under Article 1493.
Both the workers' compensation scheme and forced heirship law involve
social legislation designed principally to protect the worker (at least
originally) and the descendant, respectively, and to provide for their
support. Initially, because at the beginning the amount awarded the
worker was modest, policy dictated that a judge should err on the side of
the worker. Considering the unanimity with which the Legislature
rejected the recommendation that incapable descendants should not be
forced heirs and the fact that the law reserves only a portion, not the
entirety of the decedent's estate, policy dictates that the judge should
likewise err on the side of the descendant if doubt exists as to the extent
of his incapacity or its permanency. 47
The thirty-three year old child seeking to be recognized as a forced heir, which
he most surely was,' sought reduction of the legacy made to his father, the
divorced husband of the testator, of the entirety of his mother's estate. The legatee
whose second marriage to the testato 9 ended in a divorce remained her universal
legatee' 0 Thus, despite a demand for a mere one-quarter of the estate of his
Incapacitated Dependant Program. Plaintiff has difficulty with money transactions, banking
and he cannot perform more than one task at a time. His brother, aunts and uncles help him
with banking tasks and make sure he gets to appointments. Plaintiff lived with his mother
until her death. He now lives with his brother, Robert Martinez (Robert), who works
offshore. Robert buys the groceries and gives money to one of plaintiff's uncles for
plaintiff's use before he goes offshore. While Robert is offshore, plaintiff's family help him
with purchasing other groceries or necessities. A friend stays with plaintiff during his
brother's absence.
46. Id.
47. Spaht, supra note 33, at 94.
48. Even the author of the Louisiana Bar Journal notes on recent developments in Trusts, Estate,
Probate and Immovable Property Law commented as follows on the Martinez decision: "Certainly Mr.
Martinez is no invalid, but can any person who is 'unemployable' because of his mental disability be
truly capable of administering his estate? The court's decision seems to indicate that a person is not
a forced heir if he can administer his estate with the help of others, though he might not be able to do
so on his own." 47 La. B. J. 252(1999).
49. In her will the testator had provided that should she and the legatee, her husband, perish in
the same event or he predeceased her, "that her four 'beloved' children and stepson were to inherit one-
third of all of her property." Martinez, 729 So. 2d at 25 (emphasis added). The assumption is that the
stepson, child of the legatee, her husband, resulted from a former marriage of the husband. It is, of
course, possible that the stepson could have been illegitimate.
50. Id. at 23: "In 1979, Mary Margaret executed a will in favor of Frederick Baldamar Martinez.
Jr. (Frederick), her husband and the father of plaintiff. In 1993, Mary Margaret and Frederick were
divorced. Mary Margaret died in 1997."
In the opinion the court recognized that under La. Civ. Code art. 1608 (5) (July I, 1999) the result
would be different since there is revocation of a testamentary disposition by operation of law when the
testator "is divorced from the legatee after the testament is executed and at the time of his death." Id.
at 25.
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deceased mother"' with whom he had lived before her death, the child's own father
refused to share with his son a portion of the estate of his ex-wife who had cared
for the child before her death. Instead, the brother of the mentally retarded child
who works offshore, and presumably the other relatives of the child's mother, must
continue to care for the child on a daily basis without the economic contribution
from the mother's estate in the form of the legitime.
Fortunately for the child and his family, the defendant is the biological father
of the mentally retarded child and at least is obliged to support the child. 2 Had the
defendant been a current or former stepparent, no legal obligation of support exists
and the injustice suffered by this needy, vulnerable child could be compounded.
The circumstances of the Martinez case illustrate in part the tension point at the
intersection of family law and succession law: the human consequences of divorce
and the impact on the law of succession. 3 The prior law of forced heirship served
to protect all children of divorce from the consequences of the decisions made by
their parent or parents. Now, only the most vulnerable of the already vulnerable
children of divorce' are supposed to be protected; but sometimes even they are not.
C. Interrelationship of Undue Influence to the Remaining Remnant of
Forced Heirship
Complementary to the enactment of the first statute redefining forced heirs as
descendants in only two categories," the legislature repealed Civil Code article
1492, which prohibited evidence of undue influence. 6 In 1991 the legislature
51. The claim had been urged on behalfof the child by an attorney for the New Orleans Pro Bono
Project since the child and the family had insufficient resources to hire a private attorney. Id. at 23.
52. La. Civ. Code art. 229: "Children are bound to maintain their father and mother and other
ascendants, who are in need, and the relatives in the direct ascending line are likewise bound to
maintain their needy descendants, this obligation being reciprocal. This reciprocal obligation is limited
to life's basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, and health care, and arises only upon proof of
inability to obtain these necessities by other means or from other sources."
See In re Tutorship of Blanque, 700 So. 2d 1077 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997) (court held obligation to
support disabled child under La. Civ. Code art. 229 not limited to basic necessities where child multi-
handicapped and functioned at age equivalent to four years).
53. See authorities cited supra notes 41-50 and a more thorough discussion in text accompanying
notes 130-175 infra.
54. See Katherine S. Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: Social Analysis and Legal
Implications. 59 La. L Rev. 63, 67 (1998): "(D]ivorce involves a radical redistribution of hardship,
from adults to children, and therefore cannot be viewed as a morally neutral act." (quoting from Barbara
Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture 184, 190 (1997)).
55. 1989 La. Acts, No. 788; 1990 La. Acts, No. 147. Both acts were subsequently declared
unconstitutional in Succession of Lauga. 624 So. 2d 1156 (1993), discussed in the text accompanying
notes 22.32 supra.
56. La. Civ. Code art. 1492 (repealed July 1, 1990): "Proof is not admitted of the dispositions
having been made through hatred, anger, suggestion or captation."
See discussion of the implications of the repeal in Katherine S. Spaht et a., The New Forced
Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable "Revolution". 50 La. L Rev. 409, 452-74 (1990).
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adopted specific legislation permitting annulment of a donation inter vivos or
mortis causa which resulted from undue influence." Clearly, the legislative intent
was "to afford some protection to otherwise vulnerable descendants,"'" who had
previously been protected from disinherison by the institution of forced heirship.
Thus, unlike common law jurisdictions where undue influence had developed first
to protect the testator's autonomy and then to protect "family members," the
legislature in Louisiana envisioned undue influence as a narrowly targeted
protective device.'9 Undue influence constituted the legislature's protective
response to the severe curtailment of forced heirship, in other words principally for
the sake of otherwise unprotected descendants.60
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Succession of Reeves" reversed the
decision of the trial judge who had found that Ihe heirs of the testator had proved
by clear and convincing evidence undue influence by the testator's second spouse.
In the opinion Judge Saunders, writing for the majority, opined that reversal of the
trial judge's decision was primarily due to "marital status."' Judge Saunders
expressed the view that "while we are unable to categorically state that the charge
of undue influence can never be leveled against a surviving spouse who is the main
beneficiary of a testament by her spouse. . . . , the fact that the alleged
"wrongdoer" is married to the testator makes the elements of proof "almost totally
meaningless... ." Rather, undue influence exercised by a spouse of the testator
should require proof of "physical abuse, emotional abuse, fraud, deceit, orcriminal
57. La. Civ. Code art. 1479. See also La. Civ. Code art. 1483 which concerns the burden of
persuasion imposed upon a person who attacks a donation on the grounds of undue influence.
58. Spaht et al., supra note 4 at 411-12: "In an effort to afford protection to other descendants
[other than those designated as forced heirs] from unjust disinherison by a parent. the Act [No. 788 of
1989) also repealed the prohibition against evidence of captation or undue influence. The result of the
repeal is to permit such evidence in a will contest."
59. Interestingly enough, at least one common law author has expressed the view that "the impact
of undue influence doctrine is to act as a form of forced heirship." Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue
Influence, 81 Minn. L Rev. 571- (1997) (arguing that the undue influence doctrine protects children).
For an opinion at variance with that of Madoff only because he does not believe that undue influence
sufficiently protects children from disinheritance and is indirect and inefficient at best, see Ronald
Chester, ShouldAmerican Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance?, 32 Real Prop., Probate &
Trust J. 405 (1997). Of course. other common law connntators have expressed the same view. See
discussion and authorities cited in text accompanying notes 74-104 iqfra.
60. Spaht et al., supra note 4 at 453: "Prohibiting evidence of captation to accomplish such
desirable social policies was part of a delicately balanced system, which offered concomitant protection
by means of forced heirship to those not deserving of disinherison. The institution of forced heirship
provided descendants with some protection against total disinherison at the whim of the parent...."
See also Spaht et al. supra note 2.
61. 704 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997), writs granted, No. 98-C-0581, 1998 WL 231451
(La. May 1. 1998).
62. Id. at 260.
63. Id. at 258.
64. Id. at 259.
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conduct."65 The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs in Succession ofReeves;"
but before the case could be argued, the parties reached a compromise.
The court in Reeves erroneously grafts onto the provisions of Civil Code
articles 147967 and 1483" additional requirements for proving undue influence
whenever the alleged "wrongdoer" is the spouse of the testator; these
jurisprudential requirements seriously undermine the purpose of these articles.
These two articles, the former that describes undue influence and the latter that
imposes a different burden of proof when there exists a confidential relationship
between the testator and the "wrongdoer," clearly establish that a spouse of a
testator may indeed exercise influence over the testator that is undue. Article 1479
does not exclude a surviving spouse as the person exercising the influence; and
Article 1483 specifically refuses to reduce the burden of proving undue influence,
which is clear and convincing evidence, if the person accused of undue influence
is "related to the donor by affinity." In fact the comment supports the inclusion
of the surviving spouse within the ambit of "wrongdoer": "The Article does not
lower the standard of proof where a challenge is made against a confidante who is
related to the donor by marriage... because in many instances the most likely
persons who would be involved would be a spouse or a child."70 Furthermore, to
require proof of physical abuse, fraud, deceit, or criminal conduct renders Article
1478, which permits the annulment of a donation for fraud or duress, superfluous."
The distinction between the conduct mentioned in Article 1478, such as fraud or
duress, and undue influence is that the latter involves "psychological
65. Id.
66. No. 98-C-0581, 1998 WL 231451 (La. May 1, 1998). The author, with Professors Cynthia
Samuel and Kathryn V. Lorio of Tulane University Law School and Loyola University Law School,
respectively, submitted without compensation an amici brief in our individual capacities, expressing
the same opinion about the meaning of La. Civ. Code arts. 1479 and 1483 as offered in this article. Id.
67. "A donation inter vivos or mortis causa shall be declared null upon proof that it is the product
of influence by the donee or another person that so impaired the volition of the donor as to substitute
the volition of the donee or other person for the volition of the donor.' La. Civ. Code art. 1479.
68. "A person who challenges a donation because of fraud, duress, or undue influence, must
prove it by clear and convincing evidence. However, if. at the time the donation was made or the
testament executed, a relationship of confidence existed between the donor and the wrongdoer and the
wrongdoer was not then related to the donor by affinity, consanguinity or adoption, the person who
challenges the donation need only prove the fraud, duress, or undue influence by a preponderance of
the evidence." La. Civ. Code art. 1483.
69. La. Civ. Code art. 1483.
70. La. Civ. Code art. 1483, cmt. (c).
71. La. Civ. Code art. 1478: "A donation intervivos ormortis causa shall be declared null upon
proof that it is the product of fraud or duress."
See also Laurie Dearman Clark, Louisiana s New Law on Capacity to Make andReceive Donations:
'Unduly Influenced' by the Common Law?, 67 Tul. L Rev. 183,227 (1992): "Such relations [related
by affinity, consanguinity or adoption) do not fall within the ambit of article 1483 because it is both
normal and expected that family members will exert some influence over each other. Of course, this
does not condone improper conduct by relatives, but in cases of truly egregious conduct, the opponent
should be able to establish undue influence, fraud, or duress by clear and convincing evidence, making
recognition of a relaxed standard in this context unnecessary."
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manipulation. '" 2 Other provisions of the Civil Code reflect the distinction: undue
influence is only a ground for annulment of a donation inter vivos, and fraud and
duress constitute grounds for annulment of all contracts.'3
Even though the legislative will in Article 1483 is clearly expressed, the
majority opinion in Reeves concluded that "where a spouse is the recipient of the
testator's bounty, these elements [required to prove undue influence in common
law jurisdictions] are almost totally meaningless in determining whether a person
might have exerted undue influence." Immediately following this statement, the
opinion lists the four traditional elements-susceptibility, opportunity, disposition,
and coveted result-and discusses why none apply to a marital relationship.
Susceptibility should not apply to spouses because they "should be responsive to
the needs, desires and opinions of one another.... ."; either spouse should be
"susceptible and sensitive to the desires of his or her mate. . . .05 As to
opportunity, the court correctly observed that "people who live together as man and
wife see each other daily, discuss all manner of business and personal relationships
and have unlimited opportunity to influence one another."' 6  Yet, from that
observation the court concluded that "[iln the case of a spouse, the existence of an
opportunity to influence once again is inherent in the relationship, not contra bonos
mores, and is thus not relevant in determining undue influence." ' The element of
disposition, the court opined, "requires that the alleged influencer must have a
disposition to procure 'an improper favor' for himself or another."'" Then, the
court added rather ominously, "[w]e would shake the bedrock of matrimonial law
if we were to rule that the disposition of one's property to a spouse, to provide for
the surviving spouse after the donor's death is in any way an 'improper favor."' 9
The fourth element, coveted result "begs the question as without the result there
would be no inquiry in the first place."' According to the opinion,
72. Clark, supra note 71, at 221.
73. Fraud and duress ae vices of consent and thus result in a relatively null contract. See La.
Civ. Code arts. 1953-58,1959-63, and 2031-33. Interestingly, simple error, which likewise constitutes
a vice of consent (see La. Civ. Code arts. 1949-52, 2031.33). is not mentioned in La. Civ. Code art.
1478; thus, the inference arises that error may not be urged to annul a donation. See La. Civ. Code art.
1479 cmt. (e). But see La. Civ. Code art. 1950 cmt. (d).
Without the more specific Article 1478, the provisions of Tide IV of Book 1Il, which includes the
vices of consent, would apply to a donation inter vivos because it is a contract and to a donation mortis
causa because of La. Civ. Code art. 1917: "The rules of this title are applicable also to obligations that
arise from sources other than contract to the extent that those rules are compatible with the nature of
those obligations."
74. Succession of Reeves, 704 So. 2d 252,259 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997), writs granted, No. 98-C-
0581, 1998 WL231451 (La. May 1, 1998).
75. Id.: "In a marital situation, the element of susceptibility is inherent in the relationship and has
no bearing on the issue of use of undue influence."
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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[a] review of these elements suggests that they are meaningful in a case
where property is left to a person when the natural object of a testator's
bounty is passed over in favor of strangers or persons of much lower
claims to consideration. What then would be the proper inquiry as to
undue influence on the part of a spouse? Several come to mind: physical
abuse, emotional abuse, fraud, deceit, or criminal conduct."t
Obviously, a testator would be susceptible to the influence of his spouse, and
she would have the opportunity to exercise influence; however, the influence must
be undue, "that so impaired the volition of the donor as to substitute the volition of
the donee or other person for the volition of the donor."' If, as the comment to
Article 1479 states, "creating resentment toward a natural object of a testator's
bounty by false statements. . ." may constitute the kind of influence that is
reprobated by this Article, then a second spouse may well be a wrongdoer. The
spouse may create resentment toward the testator's children through false
statements of a spouse's legal obligations under Civil Code article 98, that is, the
obligations of fidelity, support, and assistance. "Susceptibility" to influence, as
Judith Wallerstein explains in her report on her twenty-five year study of children
of divorce, can exist in a second marriage when it would not exist to the same
degree in a first marriage.83 The law does not preclude, it in fact permits, evidence
of a testator's susceptibility to influence that exceeds mere sensitivity to the other
spouse's desires. "Sensitivity" and "susceptibility" are not equivalents. After all,
undue influence requires that proof be made by clear and convincing evidence that
the wrongdoer has substituted her volition for that of the testator, and mere
sensitivity to the desires of a spouse does not mean that the spouse may substitute
her will for that of the "sensitive" testator.
Is the court in Reeves correct that the third element, disposition to procure an
"improper" advantage, is meaningless when applied to a testator's spouse?
Essentially the question posed is, can a second spouse ever be disposed to obtain
an "improper" advantage for herself (or others)? A related inquiry in common law
jurisdictions requires identifying who are the "natural objects of the testator's
bounty." In most common law jurisdictions the "natural object of the testator's
81. Id. at 259.
82. La. Civ. Code art. 1479.
83. Stepmothers. especially if they had children of their own, were often frank to say that
they resented the children of the husband's first marrage and saw them as intnzders.
While some second wives grew to love the father's children, many did not. As one woman
said, "I wanted the man. Not the kids." These attitudes were powerful influences.
Understandably, the father was eager for the new marriage to succeed and gave it priority.
Fathers who sent their stepchildren to college did not always provide financial support for
their own.
Judith Wallerstein & Julia Lewis, The Long-Term Impact of Divorce on Children: A First Reportfrom
a 25-Year Study, presented at the Second World Congress of Family Law and the Rights of Children
and Youth, Jun. 2-7, 1997, San Francisco, Ca. (on file with the author).
The Civil Code articles on successions recognize as much by providing a forced heir the right to
request security from the usufructuary who is not the parent of the forced heir. La. Civ. Code art. 1514.
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bounty" includes both the children and the spouse. As against a more remote
relation or a stranger, the classification of "natural object of the testator's bounty"
clearly includes both. If the testator dies with both children and a spouse and one
benefits to the exclusion or detriment of the other, who is the "natural object of the
testator's bounty" becomes more complicated. Nonetheless, even in common lawjurisdictions, "[t]here exists a separate class of cases where a male testator is
determined more prone to undue influence by a female: when he chooses to leave
the bulk of his estate to his second wife and excludes his children from his first
marriage.""4 In these common law jurisdictions courts recognize that the spousal
relationship is not "confidential" for purposes of undue influence, thus making
proof of such influence more difficult, with one exception: "in the context of
second wives." 5 The burden of proving undue influence of the second wife is
relaxed if the decedent has disinherited his children of the first marriage; thus,
undue influence of a second wife is easier to prove, a position that not even the
Louisiana Civil Code adopts. 6
Described as "a disposition to procure 'an improper favor' for himself or
another,"" can a second spouse who wants to procure a legacy to the prejudice of
the testator's children be considered as desiring "an improper favor"? The
84. Veena K. Murthy, Undue Influence and Gender Stereotypes: Legal Doctrine or
Indoctrination?, 4 Cardozo Women's L J. 105, 123 (1997). In footnote 105, authority for this
statement, the author states:
These cases raise a separate inquiry from those where a male testator disinherits his family
in favor of a nonrelative, and are not conducive to a similar statistical comparison. The
socially sanctioned marriage with the second wife deems her to be part of the testator's
family, thus one set of traditional beneficiaries must inevitably lose to another. Therefore,
the determination of undue influence in these cases often depends upon a variety of factors
including, but not limited to: the age discrepancy between the testator and his second wife.
the relative durations of the first and second marriages, whether the second marriage yielded
childrcn, the ages of the children involved, whether any provisions were made for the first
wife and children.
Then the author cites cases in her own article in footnotes 109-28 and Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking
Undue Influence, 81 Minn. L Rev. 571, 585-86 nn. 67-68 (1997) which also collect cases.
In the analogous situation of a testator who dies with only children and some of them receive a larger
testate share than others, the jurisprudence of other states considers the disposition unnatural although
all are "natural objects of a testator's bounty." J. Dukeminier & S. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates
169 (3d ed. 1984).
85. Murthy, supra note 84. at 124. The author then quotes from Madoff, supra note 84, at 602:
Many courts take the position that as a matter of law, there is no such thing as a confidential
relationship between a husband and a wife. For those states that do recognize the possibility
of a confidential relationship between a husband and a wife, the application of the rule is
generally limited to second marriages where children from the first marriage are disinherited.
Moreoever, in the spousal situation, greater proof of undue influence is required because of
courts' determination that a person "naturally" has influence over his or her spouse.
86. La. Civ. Code art. 1483. In relaxing the burden of persuasion of undue influence from clear
and convincing to a mere preponderance of the evidence if a confidential relationship exists between
the decedent and the wrongdoer, Article 1483 exempts spouses and makes no distinction between first
and second spouses.
87. Succession of Reeves, 704 So. 2d 252,259 (La. App. 3d Cir 1997) writs granted, No. 98-C-
0581, 1998 WL 231451 (La. May 1, 1998).
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legislative history of undue influence in Louisiana, which demonstrates an
inextricable link to the repeal of forced heirship protection for most descendants,
confirms that such a disposition could be "an improper favor." The law of intestate
succession supports such a conclusion. The intestate succession law, which is
supposed to reflect the presumed intent of the deceased as to the devolution of his
property at death,"8 provides that all descendants inherit all of the deceased's
property, both community and separate.' 9 It is accurate then to state that children,
according to the law, have a higher claim to consideration by the deceased than a
spousee and that a disposition to his spouse other than a usufruct,9' in preference
to his children can be considered an "improper" favor.
As part of the legislative history, the political circumstances of the repeal of
expansive forced heirship' also reflect that undue influence as a protection for
former forced heirs was designed to protect them not just from strangers but also
from a second spouse. The natural resentment that may exist between a second
spouse, especially a stepmother,93 and the children of a former marriage,
88. Although this has always been understood by the Louisiana legal community and the
legislature, there may be some pesent-day doubt if one examines closely the accretion rules upon
renunciation and the "anti-lapse" rules applicable to legacies of the newly effective (July 1, 1999)
articles of the Civil Code. See La. Civ. Code arts. 965, 1593, and 1595.
89. La. Civ. Code art. 888. The law provides that the surviving spouse is entitled to a usufruct
over the deceased's share of community property. La. Civ. Code art 890. But see discussion in text
accompanying notes 176-187, infra about the constitutionality of the legal usufruct over a forced heir's
legitime in favor of a stepparent. Furthermore, in the absence of descendants, the surviving spouse
inherits the deceased's sham of community property in preference to all others. La. Civ. Code art. 889.
90. "A review of theseelements [susceptibility, opportunity, disposition, coveted result) suggests
that they ame meaningful in a case where property is left to a person when the natural object of a
testator's bounty is passed over in favor of strangers or persons of much lowerclaims to consideration."
Succession of Reeves at 259.
91. La. Civ. Code arts. 890, 1499.
92. In 1989 the opposition to forced heirship received cnucial support from a wealthy
Louisiana politician and his second spouse who were feuding with the adult children of his
first marriage. The adult children had not been guilty of any acts that would have
constituted grounds for disinherison. Because his wealth consisted in large part of land, an
asset he could not move to another state to avoid Louisiana law, he and his second spouse
led and financed a campaign to change Louisiana law. The change that they wanted
necessitated an amendment to the state constitution which at the time prohibited the
abolition of forced heirship. The couple hired a lobbyist (1) to procure the two-thirds vote
of the legislature that was required to propose a constitutional amendment and paid for
advertising and organization. The campaign to abolish forced heirship conveniently
coincided with the popularity of free market, individualist philosophy that eschews restraints
on the transfer of property and welfare for the able-bodied. Hence the argument for
abolition often heard was: "It's my property. The government should not force me to leave
any of it to my able-bodied adult children."
Cynthia Samuel, Letterfrom Louisiana: An Obituary for Forced Heirship and a Birth Announcement
for Covenant Marriage, 12 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L F. 183, 185 (1997).
93. All but three men in this sample remaried soon after the divorce. One third remaried
three or more times while the child was growing up. Contact with the childalso varied with
the father's remarriage, with the attitude of the new wife and the presence of children
within the new family. It varied again with the father's second divorce. Stepmothers,
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particularly a marriage terminated by divorce, has been well documented.'
Research shows stepchildren need protection from undue influence of a stepparent,
who as a general proposition, has no natural affection for the stepchild. s Even
common law treatise writers on the subject of undue influence recognize that there
is likely to be a will contest alleging undue influence in "the 'divided family"'
situation in which there is a second spouse and children of a former marriage9 and,
as earlier noted, describe a harsh position taken by some common law courts
toward a second spouse if the testator has disinherited his children of a former
.97marriage.
Finally, the trial court in Reeves concluded that the second wife's "desire to
be included in the will, coupled with her ever-present ability to withhold intimacy,
constituted a force strong enough to substitute her volition for his."' Yet the court
of appeal opined that "[oin public policy grounds we decline to find these grounds
adequate for reversing the stated will of the testator. " 9 Apparently, the public
policy grounds consisted of the court's refusal to establish "ground rules for the
granting or withholding of intimacy"" which according to the court, is best left to
the married couple rather than the civil courts. Civil courts consider on a regular
basis whether a spouse has complied with the positive obligation of fidelity, the
obligation to share one's sexual potential with one's spouse.' The issue of
unjustified refusal of sexual intercourse historically arose in connection with the
especially if they had children of their own, were often frank to say that they resented the
children of the husband's first marriage and saw them as intruders. While some second
wives grew to love the father's children, many did not. As one woman said, 'I wanted the
man. Not the kids." These attitudes were powerful influences. Understandably, the father
was eager for the new marriage to succeed and gave it priority. Fathers who sent their
stepchildren to college did not always provide financial support for their own.
Wallerstein & Lewis, supra note 83 (emphasis added). See also discussion in text accompanying notes
130-175 infra.
94. See Wallerstein & Lewis, supra note 83 and further discussion in text accompanying notes
130-175 infra.
95. See discussion in text accompanying notes 130-175 infra.
96. Spaht et al., supra note 56 at 473 n.260 (quoting J. Dukeminier & S. Johanson. Wills, Trusts,
and Estates 169 (3d ed. 1984)). See also Ronald Chester, supra note 59, at 410-11:
Increasingly, disinheritance involves families reconstituted after divorce and remarriage.
Before divorce and remarriage became as common as they are today, testators and legislators
undoubtedly believed that a will or statute protecting surviving spouses would also serve to
protect the children of a single marriage because the survivor of this marriage would
necessarily have the children at heart.... Today it is hardly surprising that the precipitating
causes of one-third of will contests are divorce and remarriage. Most of these contests are
brought by children and stepchildren.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
98. Succession of Reeves, 704 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997), writs granted, No. 1998
WL231451 (La. May 1. 1998)
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Von Bechman v. Von Bechman, 386 So. 2d 910 (La. 1980); Favrot v. Barnes, 332
So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), writ denied, 334 So. 2d 436 (La. 1976); Phillpott v. Phillpott, 285
So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ refused, 288 So. 2d 643 (La. 1974).
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• offended spouse's right to a separation from bed and board for cruel treatment.' °2
Now the issue arises when a claimant seeks spousal support after divorce.I Civil
courts continue to examine whether the withholding of intimacy is a breach of a
spouse's legal obligation of fidelity; the matter is not "reserved to the good
judgment of the members of the marriage unit... ." Public policy is implicated
in the decision of Succession of Reeves, but not for the reason stated in the majority
opinion. To immunize a spouse, or anyone else, from an accusation of undue
influence permits the possibility of "legalized theft," which was the societal
problem specifically addressed by the legislation on undue influence.
I. WHAT OF DISINHERISON?
A. Legislative History of the Repeal of Disinherison
In Act No. 1421 of 1997, which contained the Louisiana State Law Institute's
comprehensive revision of the law of successions, the Civil Code articles on
disinherison were inadvertently repealed.'es Discovery of the repeal in January,
1999, prompted the Law Institute to propose new articles on disinherison of forced
heirs by amendment in the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure to House
Bill No. 933, 1999 Regular Session. With virtually little change in the law of
disinherison, except the modernization and reduction of the number of just
grounds,"M the bill as amended passed the House Committee on April 20. On April
29 the bill was returned to the calendar in the House of Representatives and not
subsequently called from the calendar until approximately six weeks later on June
8. Although several floor amendments were proposed to the bill," the bill passed
the House of Representatives with only a few amendments to different portions of
102. La. Civ. Code art. 138 (repealed Jan. ]. 1991). But see grounds for separation from bed and
board in a covenant marriage, which includes cruel treatment, La. R.S. 9:307 B(6) (1994).
103. La. Civ. Code art. IIl (eff. Jan. 1.1998).
104. Succession of Reeves. 704 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997). writs granted, No. 1998 WL
231451 (La. May 1, 1998).
105. 1997 La. Acts, No. 1421, §1 (cited supra note 10).
See also Official Digest, 1999 La. H.B. 933: "In Acts 1997. No. 1421, effective July 1. 1999, the
present law of disinherison, Civil Code Arts. 1617 through 1624, were inadvertently repealed in
connection with the successions revision.
Proposed law retains the present law of disinherison by redesignating those articles effective June
30, 1999 ......
In the Editor's Note to La. Civ. Code art. 1494 (Special Millenium Edition, 2000) at 290, the author
of the note observes: "In dismantling the civil law of succesions, the Successions Revision Committee
of the Louisiana State Law Institute repealed Article 1621 ......
106. See L. H.B. No. 933, Reg. Sess. 1999, § 1.
107. Among the amendments proposed was one that would have conformed the provisions of
House Bill No. 933 on disinherison to the content of Senate Bill No. 595, 1999 Regular Session which
had already passed the Senate. The difference between the two bills (HB No. 933 and SB No. 595)
principally concerned the burden of proof of reconciliation: House Bill No. 933 imposed the burden
on the forced heir and Senate Bill No. 595 imposed the burden of proof on the other heirs. The
amendment failed.
2000]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the bill. Senate Committee on Judiciary A scheduled a hearing for House Bill No.
933 on Monday, June 14, the last day for hearings before that Senate committee;
but with only one senator present, the hearing was adjourned for lack of a quorum.
Later the same day, June 14, in the House of Representatives, Representative
Chuck McMains offered an amendment to Senate Bill No. 488 by Senator Ron
Landry, relative to statutory wills, that would have retained the Civil Code
provisions on disinherison.It Representative Tom Thornhill requested a ruling
from the Chair on the germaneness of the amendment, and the Chair ruled "that the
... amendments were not germane to the subject matter contained in the bill as
introduced,""'° 9 whereupon Representative McMains moved to withdraw the
amendments. The legislature adjourned on June 21 without taking action to reenact
the articles on disinherison. With that ambiguous legislative history, it is difficult
to draw any clear inferences about the precise legislative intent as to grounds for
disinherison.
Repeal of the articles on disinherison has created speculation ranging from the
obvious conclusion, repeal eliminates all grounds for disinherison,"' to the
opposite conclusion, repeal permits the parent to disinherit for any cause and the
court ultimately determines its justice on a case-by-case basis."' Furthermore, the
speculation and diametrically opposed conclusions implicate the provision of the
Louisiana Constitution that states the grounds for disinherison shall also be
provided by law." 2 The better view is that based upon the history of disinherison
in Louisiana and the constitutional mandate that the grounds are to be provided by
law," 3 all of the provisions of the law of disinherison have been repealed. Thus,
108. Official Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana. Fifty-Third Day's
Proceedings, Monday, June 14, 1999, pp. 2786-87.
109. Id. at 2787.
110. See Editor's Note. La. Civ. Code art. 1494 (Special Millenium Edition, 2000) at 290: "Indismantling the civil law of successions, the Successions Revision Committee of the Louisiana StateLaw Institute repealed Article 1621. As a result, the 'unless' clause of Article 1494 is now devoid of
meaning and a testator may no longer disinherit aforced heir." (emphasis added). The Editor's Note
was written by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos of Tulane University Law School, who compiles the yearly
editions of the Louisiana Civil Code.
'The author of this article agiees entirely with Professor Yiannopoulos.
11. See Max Nathan, Forced Heirship: The Unheralded "New" Disinherison Rules, 74 Tul LRev. 1027 (2000); Paul A. Hood, "Disinherison," The Estate Planner 1336 (1999):
Do we still have disinherison? Yes. Article 1494, Civil Code provides that a forced heir
may be deprived of legitime if "the decedent has just cause to disinherit him." What is just
cause now? Neither the historical causes, nor the provision which restricted "just cause" to
the ones expressly enumerated in the Civil Code, remain in the Civil Code. That brings usback full circle--what is "just cause?" The answer will be determined on a case by case
basis by the judge, which might be as it should have been all along.
112. La. Const. art. XI1, § 5(B). For text of the constitutional provision, see supra note 21.
113. See Editor's Note, supra note 110:
It may be argued that courts may infuse meaning into Article 1494 and establish '"just
causes" for disinherison by resorting to equity under Article 4 of the Civil Code. However,
Article 12. Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution declares that "the grounds for
disinherison shall also be provided by law," and the sources of law in Louisiana arelegislation and customs, not judicial decisions. See La. Civil Code Article 1. Moreover,
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a forced heir may no longer be disinherited.' 1' To reach the opposite conclusion
would require reliance upon the phrase in Civil Code article 1494, "unless the
decedent has just cause to disinherit." That clause must be understood in light of
its amendment and re-enactment in 1996 as a means of cross-referencing the then
existing provisions on grounds for disinherison." s Unlike other Civil Code
articles, such as the article that denies final support to a spouse "at fault,"' 6 the
words just grounds for disinherison have never been interpreted independently of
the complementary provisions concerning the manner of disinherison, the grounds
for disinherison, the burden of proof of those grounds, and proof of reconciliation
between the decedent and the forced heir."' Without the repealed articles to give
those words in Article 1494 content, they have no independent meaning:
The Louisiana legislature has repealed Article 1621 of the Louisiana Civil
Code that established the twelve grounds for disinherison and the re-
establishment of those grounds by the courts as 'just causes' for
disinherison under Article 1494 would be judicial legislation forbidden
by Article 2, § 2 of the Louisiana Constitution."'
Article 4 of the Civil Code is not a blanket authorization to courts to create laws when the
Louisiana legislature has not enacted laws, or, afortiori, to resurrect laws that the legislature
has repealed. Resort to equity under Article 4 is proper in exceptional circumstances for the
mitigation of harsh results in the framework of existing laws, when neither legislation nor
customs address a particular issue. Equity under Article 4 is thus a device for correction of
law rather (than] creation of law. Louisiana courts have, indeed, resorted to equity in the
past but sparingly. they have never resorted to equity in order to pass judicial legislation.
114. See Editor's Note, supra note 110. Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos of the Tulane University
Law School, author of the note, holds the same opinion.
115. La. Civ. Code art. 1621 (repealed by 1997 La. Acts. No. 1421, eff. July I, 1999).
According to Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos in his Editor's Note to Louisiana Civil Code article 1494
which contains the "unless" clause, "[als a result [of the repeal of the Louisiana Civil Code articles on
disinherison], the 'unless' clause of Article 1494 is now devoid of meaning and a testator may no longer
disinherit a forced heir." See supra note 110.
116. Louisiana Civil Code article I Il (eff. Jan. 1, 1998), previously Louisiana Civil Code article
112, that according to the court in Currier v. Currier, 599 So. 2d 456 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992). was
unaffected by the repeal of the grounds for a separation from bed and board in 1991 contained in Article
138. The reason the interpretation of "fault" in Article 112 was unaffected by the repeal of Article 138
in 1990 (effective Jan. i, 1991) was that the word fault in Article 112 had developed its own meaning
by interpretation of the court. Fault had been interpreted in numerous opinions to include cruel
treatment, adultery, and other causes for separation from bed and board.
117. La. Civ. Code arts. 1617-24 (repealed July 1, 1999).
118. La. Civ. Code art. 1494, Editor's Note by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos (Special Millenium
Edition, 2000) at 291. He adds: "Such judicial action would of course be permissible, if the 1997
Revision of Successions has turned Louisiana into a common law jurisdiction contrary to the
constitutional mandate of Article 3, 15(B) that '(nlo system or code of laws shall be adopted by general
reference to it.' Cf. Succession of Lissa, 198 La. 129, 3 So. 2d 534 (1941)."
In the preceding paragraph of the Editor's Note in direct reference to this argument made first by
Paul Hood and then by Max Nathan (see supra note 111), Professor Yiannopoulos opines:
It may be argued that courts may infuse meaning into Article 1494 and establish "just
causes" for disinherison by resorting to equity under Article 4 of the Civil Code. However,
Article 12. Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution declares that "the grounds for
disinherison shall also be provided by law," and the sources of law in Louisiana are
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B. Constitutional Power of the Legislature as to Disinherison
"The amount of the forced portion reserved to the heirs and the grounds
for disinherison shall also be provided by law.. .."
The quoted language comprises the third sentence of Article XII, § 5, B of the
Louisiana Constitution (1995). It is virtually identical to its precedecessor, the
second sentence of Article XII, § 5 (1974),"' which the Louisiana Supreme Court
interpreted in Succession of Lauga. °
Every provision must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the
provision and the interests it furthers and resolves. When a constitutional
provision is identical or very similar to that of a former constitution, it is
presumed that the same interpretation will be given to it as was attributed
to the former provision.' 2' The sentence on disinherison in the 1974
Constitution, before its amendment in 1995, related to the power reserved
to the legislature to pass laws relating to forced heirs, the amount of the
legitime, and disinherison: "the power reserved to the legislature to pass
laws relating to . . . disinherison is subordinate, ancillary, or
supplementary to the purpose of preventing the abolishment of forced
heirship."'2 Nonetheless, as Professor A.N. Yiannopoulous observes in
his Editor's Note to Civil Code article 1494, the power to provide grounds
for disinherison resides with the legislature, not the courts. 123
In the 1995 version of Article XII, § 5, the third sentence is subordinate to the
first two sentences but clearly written recognizing the connexity of all three."U The
legislation and customs, not judicial decisions. See La. Civil Code Article 1. Moreover,
Article 4 of the Civil Code is not a blanket authorization to courts to create laws when the
Louisiana legislature has not enacted laws, or, afortiori, to resurrect laws that the legislature
has repealed. Resort to equity under Article 4 is proper in exceptional circumstances for the
mitigation of harsh results in the framework of existing laws, when neither legislation nor
customs address a particular issue. Equity under Article 4 is thus a device for correction of
law rather [than] creation of law. Louisiana courts have, indeed, resorted to equity in the
past but sparingly; they have never resorted to equity in order to pass judicial legislation.
119. "The determination of forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion and the grounds for
disinherison shall be provided by law .. " (emphasis added) La. Coast. 1974, art. XI1, § 5.
120. 624 So. 2d 156 (La. 1993).
121. Id. at 1165. "It also is a well established rule of constitutional construction that where a
constitutional provision similaror identical to that used in a prior constitution is adopted, it is presumed
such provision was adopted with the construction previously placed on it by the jurisprudence." Id. at
1167 (internal citations omitted).
122. Id.
123. La. Civ. Code art. 1494. Editor's Note, supra note Ii0 at 290: "However, Article 12. Section
5 of the Louisiana Constitution declares that 'the grounds for disinherison shall also be provided by
law,' and the sources of law in Louisiana are legislation and customs, not judicial decisions ......
124. One change in the language of the second sentence of 1974 La. Const. art. XII, § 5, made in
the present language of the third sentence of Article Xli, § 5. is insertion of the word also which
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third sentence continues to be subordinate by virtue of a comparison of the
structure of the first and third sentences: the first sentence directs the legislature
to provide for the classification of the descendants, but the third sentence merely
provides that the grounds for disinherison "shall also be provided by law." The
virtually identical sentence in the 1974 version of Article XII, § 5 was interpreted
in Succession of Lauga as "similar to the jurisprudential gloss on the 1921
provision to the effect that the legislature may implement and regulate forced
heirship subject to and not inconsistent with the core principle...."25 Thereafter,
in Lauga the Louisiana Supreme Court opined in language particularly important
for the current version of Article XII, § 5 (B):
The wording of the second (now third] sentence and its placement make
it so similar to the idea that the legislature may implement and regulate
laws without changing the basic principle, right, and purpose offorced
heirship that it is difficult to read into it an intention to make any major
change in the law.... Furthermore, as we observed earlier, the second
[now third] sentence's provision occupies a subordinate position
following the first sentence's clear, explicit statement of Article XII, § 5's
constitutional purpose-an express limitation on legislative power
without which there would have been no point in including any of its
three sentences in the constitution. Therefore, the second sentence [now
third] may be construed reasonably only as a provision that makes explicit
the jurisprudential interpretation that had been placed on the source
provision, viz., that the legislative function is to mould and implement the
legal institution of forced heirship without thwarting or destroying the
fundamental and enduring rights, principle, or purposes that it
encompasses.126
The third sentence of Article XII, § 5 (B), contains a grant of legislative power to
implement the institution of forced heirship consistent with its "core principles" by
enacting grounds for disinherison.
C. So What Has Become of Disinherison? Conclusions
The third sentence does not require that the legislature enact grounds for
disinherison; in fact the legislature is prohibited from doing so if inconsistent with
likewise appears in the sentence preceding: "'The legislature may also classify as forced heirs
descendants of any age who. becauseof mental incapacity of physical infirmity, are incapable of taking
care of their persons or administering their estates .... (emphasis added).
125. Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1165 (La. 1993).
126. Id. at 1167-68. (emphasis added).
As five of the leading forced heirship commentators have observed, "the constitution
provision allowing the legislature to determine forced heirs, the amount of the legislature to
determine forced portion, and the grounds of disinheritance is not an invitation to destroy
the concept, but a grant of flexibility within the confines of the institution of forced
heirship."
Id. (citing Spaht et al., supra note 4, at 414).
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the "core principle" of forced heirship. In light of its history and placement the
sentence does convey that if forced heirs are to be denied their forced portion it
must only be for limited and just causes specified by the legislature.
The legislature exercised its power to implement the institution of forced
heirship in a manner entirely consistent with the "core principles" of the new
forced heirship. The legislature repealed all of the grounds for disinherison, an act
consistent with the first principle of forced heirship, 27 extracting effectively and
efficiently support for needy incapable children.' Even had the legislature so
intended, it could not have repealed the limited causes for disinherison to permit
a case-by-case determination ofjust cause, at least as to children under twenty-four,
because the Louisiana Constitution permits the legislature to act as to disinherison
only so long as the action does not violate the "core principles" of the institution.
To permit the parent to disinherit children under twenty-four for any reason ajudge
deems just cause is to violate the core principle of the new forced heirship,
understood to require limited, specified causes for disinherison as a way to assure
support for needy children of tender age and to combat unjust disinherison of such
children. Of course, the forced heir as any heir or legatee may be deprived of his
inheritance by proof of his unworthiness-a successful or unsuccessful attempt on
the life of the parent.'29
127. Considering that forced heirship is restricted to young and incapable children for the
purpose of providing for their support, grounds for disinherison should be carefully
considered with a view to paring them down significantly. In fact, in 1989 one member of
the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure asked whether Louisiana law should
permit disinherison if forced heirship was nothing more than a substitute for support.
Furthermore, Article 1624, which imposes an onerous burden of proof upon the forced heir.
challenging disinherison, needs serious rethinking.
Katherine Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The Regrettable "Revolution" Completed, 57 La. L Rev.
55. 139 (1996).
128. Other principles related to the first principle of the new forced heirship include combating
unjust disinherison of such children, relieving the people of the state collectively of the responsibility
of maintaining such children through the use of public funds, and providing certainty as to the amount
due the child which has the effect of reducing litigation and encouraging settlement. See discussion
in text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
129. La. Civ. Code art. 941 (eff. July 1, 1999): "A successor shall be declared unworthy if he is
convicted of a crime involving the intentional killing, or attempted killing, of the decedent or is
judicially determined to have participated in the intentional, unjustified killing, or attempted killing,
of the decedent ......
A forced heir, although different from an intestate or testate successor since he takes a fraction of the
active mass of the parent's estate despite the will of the parent, derives his right ab intestato. See K.
A. Cross, A Treatise, Successions § 90 at 136 (1891).
See also Cynthia Samuel, supra note 92, at 187: "Now that forced heirs are only the young and the
handicapped, a parent should not be able to disinherit them. A forced heir should be susceptible of
disqualification only for acts of unworthiness like any heir ab intestato." (emphasis added).
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IV. THE UNFINISHED BusINEss OF THE STEPPARENT USUFRUCT
A. The Reality of the "Lumpy" Family
Although the stepfamily is more often referred to in popular literature as the
"blended" family, 130 reality more closely resembles a "lumpy" family, a label
coined by Maggie Gallagher in The Abolition of Marriage: How We Destroy
Lasting Love. 3' Experts' optimism at the beginning of the 1980s about the widely
assumed proposition that "what is good for adults of a family must be good for
their children"' 32 suffered from two principal discoveries: "First, remarriages
turned out to be even more unstable than first marriages.... Second, and even
more devastating in psychological terms, children in stepfamilies do no better on
average than children in single-parent homes.' 33 The story on the cover of U.S.
News & WorldReport on November 29, 1999, "The Rise of the Stepfamily," began
with the apt subtitle, "When Strangers Become Family." Even though focused on
giving advice about how to make the new family "work," the article acknowledged
that:
A variety of studies have demonstrated that stepkids do more poorly
on a variety of measures than do kids who live in traditional, two parent
families-even adjusting for income level. They are more apt to repeat
a grade in school, have disciplinary problems, and drop out of school
altogether. In fact, these studies collectively indicate that stepchildren do
130. Paul Hood, Jr., a well-known estate planner, expressed the following opinion in Forced
Heirship-Spousal Usufructs, Estate Planner 1328-35 (1999): "Let me begin by saying that I don't
disagree with the sociological studies or their conclusions which indicate that step-parents do not have
the same bond with step-children that natural parents have."
131. Maggie Gallagher, The Abolition of Marriage: How We Destroy Lasting Love, 71 (1996)
(title of Chapter 6 at 69): "They call it the blended family, but if tnzth-in-advertlsing laws applied to
sociologists, they would re-label it the lumpy family."
132. Id. The author adds that this assumption "turns out to be a myth."
133. Id. For the first "discovery" the author cites Andrew Cherlin, Remarriage as an Incomplete
Institution, Am. J. Soc. 84,634 (1978); Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., & Graham B. Spanier. Recycling the
Family: Remarriage After Divorce 86-90. (Sage Publications 1987). For the second discovery, the
author cites J.A. Jacobs & Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Changing Places: Conjugal Careersand Women's
Marital Mobility, Social Forces 64, 714.
"After surveying the recent literature, Furstenberg and Chedin came to the same sad conclusion: 'It
appears that children in stepfamilies have the same frequency of problems as do children in single-
parent families.' Id. at 72. For this statement the author cites Frank F. Furstenberg. Jr. & Andrew J.
Cherlin, Divided Families: What Happens to Children When Parents Part 77 (Harvard Univ. Press
1991).
But see Stepparenting: Issues in Theory, Research, and Practice 4-5 (Kay Pasley & Marilyn Iinger.
Tallman eds., 1994) [hereinafter Stepparenting] in which in the introduction the editors observe:
Similarly, no differences were found on measures of academic achievement between
children from stepfamilies and those in first-marriage families [referring to 1987 and 1990
studies]. However, the results of these studies do suggest that children of divorce. single-
parent households may be at greater risk for academic difficulties than children from either
of the other two types of families.
However, regarding behavioral problems and other antisocial conduct in children, the findings varied.
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about as well as kids who live with a single parent, which is to say much
worse than kids in traditional nuclear families.
And that's not the worst of it. According to extensive research by
Martin Dkaly and Margo Wilson of McMaster University in Ontario,
stepchildren are more likely to be abused, both physically and sexually,
and even more likely to be killed by a parent-100 times as
likely--compared with kids being raised by two biological parents.
Another line of research indicates that they are less likely to be provided
for. For example, American children living with a stepparent are less
likely to go to college and to receive family financial support if they do.
New research also shows that biological mothers around the world spend
more of family income on food-particularly milk, fruit, and
vegetables-and less on tobacco and alcohol, compared with mothers
raising nonbiological children. The list goes on.'" 4
Social scientists disagree as to the reasons why these "lumpy" families fare so
poorly: some argue an overromanticization of the new family; 35 others, a lack of
consensus about the role of stepparents and stepchildren; 3 and still others, a
cultural bias against stepfamilies, 37 formed these days most often by divorce of the
134. The Rise ofthe Stepfamily: When Strangers Become Family, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov.
29, 1999, at 61-62.
See also Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman & Kay Pasley, Steplamilies in 1984 and Today--A Scholarly
Perspective in Stepfamilies: History, Research and Policy 30-32 (1997) (entitled "Children's
Adjustment in Stepfamilies" which confimns the poor outcomes for children in stepfamilies); Judith L
Rubenstein et al., Suicidal Behavior in Adolescents: Stress and Protection in Different Family
Contexts, Am. J. Orthopsychiatry, Apr. 1998, at 274 ("Depression and stress especially family
suicidality, feelings of violation, and sexuality increased the risk, as did parental separation, divorce,
and most dramatically, remariage."), and more recently, William H. Jeynes, Effects of Remarriage
Following Divorce on the Academic Achievement of Children, 28 J. of Youth and Adolescence 385-93
(1999) reported in "New Research," The Family in America I (Dec. 1999).
135. What psychologist Bray calls "romantic" stepfamilies picture themselves as the ideal-
ized nuclear family, and they do whatever they can to fit into that mold--usually with
unhappy results. The main problem, Bray says, is that in their impatience to be seen as
traditional, these families push things that should evolve slowly.... Romantic stepfamilies,
on the other hand, spend a lot of time in forced camaraderie, and teens are especially quick
to detect the falseness.
U.S. New & World Rep., Nov. 29, 1999, supra note 134. at 62.
See also Lawrence H. Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, Adolescent Stepchild-Stepparent Relationships:
Changes over Time in Stepparenting: Issues in Theory, Research, and Practice 87, 104 (1994) in which
the first key point of the chapter is ". Intimacy and closeness with the stepparent decreases over time
as stepchildren become adolescents;" Donna S. Quick et al., Stepmothers and Their Adolescent
Children: Adjustment to New Family Roles in Stepparenting 105 (1994).
136. See, e.g., Stepparenting, supra note 133, at 7.
137. The Rise of the Stepfamily: When Strangers Become Family, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov.
29, 1999, at 67: "Ultimately, the changes that will strengthen stepfamifies will likely come from shifts
in cultural prejudices."
"Although in most Western societies the stigma of divorce and remarriage has likely been reduced
due to the relatively high rates of divorce and remarriage, in the United States there is still an
undercurrent of moral outrage directed towards those who divorce. This moral outrage is often extended
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parents rather than a parent's death. 3 ' Yet, Maggie Gallagher observes, that by
"[flailing to understand the erotic relations that are at the heart of family
life... .'" experts failed to predict that remarriage is not only not a cure for the
pain inflicted upon children by divorce; "it is often one of the risks children of
divorce face.""4 ' Because the erotic interests of the families diverge with divorce
and remarriage, the possibilities for conflicts in loyalty proliferate: "Recognition
of this reality is what has made the stepfamily so suspect (from the child's point of
view), the object of fear and fairy tales that center on the child's recognition that
his interests and his stepparent's interests are not the same: The wicked stepmother
may want to kill me off to keep her husband's goodies for her own children.''.
to remarriages and stepfamilies, because most remarriages follow divorce." Lawrence H. Ganong &
Marilyn Coleman, How Society Views Stepfamilies in Stcpfainlies: History, Research, and Policy 87
(1997). "The second way that societies view stepfamilies is to see them as less functional more
problematic than nuclear families." Id. at 85-86.
138. Id. at 64.
According to historian Stephanie Coontz, author of The Way We Really Are: Coming to
Terms With America's Changing Families, stepfamilies are not a new phenomenon in
American life, but the dynamics have changed in important ways. Before divorce rates
exploded in the 1970s, stepfamilies were usually formed after the death of a parent, and
those stepfamilies could in effect create a second nuclear family. But modem stepfamilies
are mostly the product of divorce (or out-of-wedlock births), and it's nearly impossible for
these families to fit the traditional mold. Most have to deal with ex-spouss-the "ghost at
the dinner table," in one expert's phrasing-and often with the exes' new families as well.
139. Gallagher, supra note 131. at 73.
140. Id. "Remarriages an a fertile arena for conflicts between stepparent and a child whose young
life has already been marked by many such conflicts." Id. at 74. "Of all the risks to which remarriage
exposes children, one of the most common and least remarked is redivorce." Id. at 76.
The result for children is the repeated experience from an early age of love failing-both
between adults and between adults and children.... The initial experience of love's failure
and the abandonment most children experience in the immediate aftermath of divorce is
confirmed again and again in the years ahead.
Id. at 79.
In findings from the National Survey of Children in 1993, ZiD, Morrison & Coiro. the authors
concluded "that remarriage did not have a protective effect, but that it ameliorated some effects for
those children who experienced marital disruption early and for whom the remarriage remained intact."
Marilyn lhinger-Tallman & Kay Pasley, Stepfamilies in 1984 and Today-A Scholarly Perspective. in
Stepfamilies: History, Research, and Policy 30 (1997). In the same article, however, the authors
acknowledged that our post-modem era "is characterized by sequential marriage" and "about 60% of
remarried couples now dissolve their unions, and couples are divorcing sooner than they did in the
1980s." Id. at 24.
141. Gallagher. supra note 131, at 75.
In the National Survey of Children, close to half of parents with both children and
stepchildren agreed that their stepchildren did not think of them as real parents, it was more
difficult to be a stepparent than a natural parent, it was more difficult to discipline their
stepchildren, it was more difficult for them to love their stepchildren than their biological
children, and their children would have been better off if they had grown up with two
biological parents. (emphasis added).
Id. at 74. Cited as authority for these conclusions, was Furstenberg & Cherlin. Divided Families, supra
note 133, at 81-82.
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Tales about the wicked stepmother abound in cultures around the world, so
social scientists have now been led to consider whether "this archetype might be
rooted in fact." 42 Social scientists who study stepfamilies "agree that families with
a full-time stepmother do worse than families with a stepfather."" There is
See the same sentiment expressed in Christina Hughes, Stepparent: Wicked or Wonderful?,150
(1999): "The responsibilities of parenthood prioritises children's needs. As Backett states 'the
immediate needs of children were felt to be predominant in the everyday familial interactions.'
Nevertheless, in the stepfamily the children's needs may be divergent to those of the stepparent and the
natural parent." (internal citations omitted).
In W. Glenn Clingempeel et al., Toward a Cognitive Dissonance Conceptualization of Stepchildren
and Biological Children Loyalty Conflicts: A Construct Validity Study, in Stepparenting: Issues in
Theory, Research, and Practice 151, 173 (1994): "[mlost stepfathers subscribed to an equity principle:
a belief that equal amounts of personal resources should be given to stepchildren and biological
children. However, they reported that they actually gave more time and money to stepchildren and
more affection to biological children." (emphasis added). Judith Wallerstein's twenty-five year study
confirmed such conduct by stepfathers. See supra note 93.
142. U.S. News& World Rep., Nov. 29,1999, supra note 134, at 62. But see Christina Hughes,
Stepparents: Wicked or Wonderful? (1999). The author states in the introduction to the small book.
Nevertheless, this is not true of my own life and this work arose directly from biographical
experience. I am a stepmother.... It speaks of a problem. My desire to consider this
problem of the negative stereotype was a primary consideration when I began the research.
... As I have stated the starting point of the research was the myth of the wicked
stepmother. Cinderella and Snow White are the most common examples ofjust how wicked
stepmothers are supposed to be.
Id. at viii (emphasis added). "I argue here (chapter 7) that myth is the prominent feature of the
stepmother's experience of living in a stepfamily which is not equalled by the stepfather's experience."
Id. at ix (emphasis added). Her study consists of participant observation infive stepfamilies over a
twelve-month period.
143. Id. In a recent case Becnel v. Becnel, 732 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999). the court
reviewed a decision by the trial court denying the father's motion for a modification of a visitation
restriction imposed earlier that child could not be in the presence of the stepmother. See also lhi -
Tallman, supra note 134, at 22, 23, 26, 27, and 31:
[Allmost all of the research substantiates that the stepmother-stepchild relationship is the
most difficult of all stepmember relations, more problematic than the stepfather-stepchild
relationship.
When behavior and emotional problems were combined, girls in father-stepmother
families were at greatest risk for problems.
The literature overwhelmingly suggests that relationships with stepchildren are more
difficult for stepmothers than stepfathers.... Further, MacDonald and Demaris (1996)
found stepmothers had a more difficult time rearing stepchildren than did stepfathers
regardless of time spent in parenting activities or household tasks.
Some evidence suggests that daughters are at greater risk for behavioral problems than
sons, and girls in stepmother families are at greatest risk for experiencing both behavior and
emotional problems.
Fine and Kurdek [in a 1992 study] reported higher levels of self-esteem and fewer social
problems among stepchildren living with stepfathers compared to those living with
stepmothers.
See generally Donna S. Quick et al.. Stepmothers and Their Adolescent Children: Adjustment to
New Family Roles in Stepparenting: Issues in Theory, Research, and Practice 105-25 (1994); W. Glenn
Clingempeel et al., Stepparent-Stepchild Relationships in Stepmother and Stepfather Families: A
Multimethod Study, Fam. Rel., July 1984, at 33, 465, 472 ("The finding that the stepmother-
stepdaughter relationship was more problematic was not expected.... [T]he remarriage of the father
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disagreement again about why stepfamilies with a stepmother are more problem-
atical: it may be that being a stepmother is simply more difficult" or that contact
with the biological mother causes more postdivorce competition and conflict.",
Focus on the difficulties of a stepfamily with a stepmother does not mean that there
are no problems with a stepfather/stepfamily, which is the most common form of
stepfamily;'" stepfathers "are often lustful and as well as cruel."" 7 Sociobiologists
and the entry of a stepmother into the household may be perceived by girls as a major threat to the
father-daughter relationships."); Cheryl L Ruett et al., Social Support Received by Children, In
Stepmother, Stepfather, and Intact Families, J. of Div. & Rem. 165, 175 (1993) ("In general, the
present study supported the proposition that children in stepmother families receive less support from
their stepmothers than children in other family structures receive from their biological mothers.");
Judith Zuker Anderson & Geoffry D. White, An Empirical Investigation of Interaction and
Relationship Patterns in Functional and Dysfunctional Nuclear Families and Stepfamllies, 25 Farm.
Process 407 (1986); Marilyn [hinger-Tallman, Research on Stepfamilies, 14 Ann. Rev. Sociol. 25, 31-
33 (1988).
144. Id.
It may be that stepmothering is simply harder, because the children's bond with the
biological mother is often very powerful. As University of Nebraska-Lincoln sociologist
Lynn White notes, a man can be a decent stepfather simply by being a provider and a nice
guy, but a stepmother is often called upon to establish "gut-level empathy and
attachment"-traits that are difficult, if not impossible, to fabricate.... Whatever the
reason, stepmothers and stepchildren are the "big losers" in these reconfigured families.
See also thinger-Tallman, supra note 134, at 23: '"Guisinger, Cowan, and Schuldberg (1989)
suggested that the greater involvement of stepmothers in the care of stepchildren results in more
opportunities for limit-setting and conflict, a finding supported by Fine and his associates (1993)."
Christina Hughes, supra note 141, at I I observes that "stepmothers are placed so centrally within
the stepfamily whilst stepfathers become almost peripheral."
145. Ihinger-Tallman, supra note 134, at 23. See also Christina Hughes, supra note 141, at 153.
146. U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 29, 1999, supra note 134, at 62.
147. Id. Support for the conclusion that a stepfather may be lustful towards his stepchildren, see
Patrick F. Fagan, The Child Abuse Crisis: The Disintegration of Marriage, Family, and the American
Community, Backgrounder (Heritage Foundation 1997), which synthesizes a series of empirical studies
of the effect of family structure on child outcomes and those studies reflect that child abuse, physical
and sexual, occurs more frequently in a stepfamily with a stepfather than in a family consisting of an
intact married couple where the husband is the biological father. See also David Blankenhom,
Fatherless America (1995).
Two researchers who have done the most significant work in this area [stepfamilies and
abuse] are Martin Daly and Margo Wilson. Their work ascertained that preschool children
who live with one biological parent and one stepparent were forty times more likely to
become an abuse case than children living in an intact home.
Glenn T. Stanton, infra note 149, at 153. "Michael Gordon, from the University of Connecticut, reports
that a girl is seven times more likely to be molested by a stepfather than a biological father.... The
molestation by stepfathers was more severe than that of biological fathers." Id. at 154.
See also Michael Gordon & Susan J. Creighton, Natal and Non-Natal Fathers as Sexual Abusers
in the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis, 50 J. of Marriage and the Fam. 99-105 (1988).
But see Rachel Filinson, Relationship in Stepfamllies: An Examination of Alliances, 17 J. Comp.
Fam. Studies 44, 58-59 (1986): "The willingness of most of the stepfathers of the sample to adopt the
total responsibility for a stepchild and to display neither favoritism for their own child(ren) nor
resentment for the stepchild (as described by their wives or girlfriends) was as striking as the close
attachment of the stepchildren in the study to their stepfathers."
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
and evolutionary psychologists 4 s explain the behavior of stepmothers and
stepfathers on biological bases that support the superiority of "genetically-related
kin,"' 49 to which evolutionary psychologists add the further explanation that
"parents are shaped by evolutionary forces to discriminate in favor of their
biological offspring." 50 Either explanation "puts stepchildren at risk and perhaps
even jeopardizes their safety."'' The biological tie internally motivates the parent
who expects emotional rewards to develop the parent-child bond and to be
committed to the long-term well-being of the child, as compared to a child and
stepparent who enter their relationship on different terms-'[iJt is a forced deal."" 2
148. See David M. Buss, The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating 3 (1999):
The breakthrough in applying sexual selection to humans came in te late 1970s and 1980s,
in the form of theoretical advances initiated by my colleagues and me in fields of
psychology and anthropology. We tried to identify underlying psychological mechanisms
that were the products of evolution-mechanisms that help to explain both the extraordinary
flexibility of human behavior and the active mating strategies pursued by women and men.
This new discipline is called evolutionary psychology.
Professor Buss, who teaches psychology at the University of Texas, was quoted recently in connection
with a study conducted by researchers from Poland and Britain to determine whether the height of men
affected the likelihood of their marrying and producing offspring (reproductive success). The findings
were published in the January 13, 2000 issue of Nature. The Advocate 2A (Jan. 13, 2000). Professor
Buss commented: "This study shows that even in modem times the kind of selection we might think
of as prehistoric continues to operate."
149. Lawrence H. Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, How Society Views Stepfamilies, in Stepfamilies:
History, Research, and Policy 87 (1997) (citing P. Poponoe, (probably D. Popenoe], The Evolution of
Marriage and the Problem of Stepfamilies: A Biosocial Perspective that appears in a larger work
Stepfamilies: Who Benefits? Who Does Not? 3-28 (A. Booth & J. Dunn, eds., 1994).
As Glenn T. Stanton explains in Why Marriage Matters: Reasons to Believe in Marriage in
Postmodern Society 152 (1997):
But the biological relationship of child and parent is important in intact families simply
because the children are theirs. Both mother and father have an equal emotional stake in
their children's lives allowing them to extend a tremedous amount of grace to their children.
Popenoe explains, based on the biosocial theory of family, that along with most species, the
human being is "genetically selfish" and is more inclined to invest in its own biological
offspring than in the offspring of others. Popenoe continues: "The reason why unrelated
stepparents find their parenting roles more stressful and less satisfying than biological
parents is probably due much less to social stigma and the uncertainty of their obligations,
as to the fact that they gain fewer intrinsic emotional rewards from canying out these
obligations."
Popenoe to whom Stanton refers is David Popenoe, The Evolution of Marriage and the Problems of
Stepfamilies: A Biosocial Perspective, in Stepfamilies: Who Benefits? Who Does Not? 3-27, 19-20
(A. Booth & J. Dunn eds., 1994). In footnote 123, citing Popenoe, Stanton in Why Marriage Matters
at 212 adds: "Hetherington [E. Mavis Heatherington] and Jodi [Kathleen M. Jodl] find credence for
this sociobiological theory in their essay (same volume. p. 67) explaining that even in long-established
blended families, biological parents and children tended to show more warmth and affection for each
other regardless of the type of family they were in as compared with parent and child in a
steprelationship."
150. David M. Buss, supra note 148. at 87-88.
151. Id. at 88.
152. Stanton. supra note 149, at 153.
[Vol. 60
KATHERINE SHAW SPAHT
In his new book The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating, David
Buss explains the purpose of the relatively new discipline of evolutionary
psychology as striving "to illuminate men's and women's evolved mating
behavior,"'5 which includes sexual strategies "to select, attract, and keep a good
mate.... ,," What women want, their preferences in a mate "are more complex
and enigmatic than the mate preferences of either sex of any other species....,,s
The reason, explains Buss, lies in the great initial parental investment of women
which makes their limited, exceptional reproductive resources extremely
valuable." Psychologically, this remains true despite modern birth control which
has altered the costs, because "human sexual psychology evolved over millions of
years to cope with ancestral adaptive problems.' 57 Women have evolved a
preference for men with resources "for their children"'5 determined by such cues
as economic resources, social status, older age, ambition and industriousness,
dependability, intelligence, compatibility, size and strength, good health, and
commitment.' 59 As the title to Chapter 3 explains, "Men Want Something Else,"
a woman with the capacity to bear many children,"W determined by such cues as
youth, health, physical beauty related to reproductive capacity, and body shape."'
Men place a premium on physical appearance. 62 Obviously, the short-term and
long-term goals of women and men may be in conflict considering that they may
be pursuing different goals and necessarily seeking different qualities.
Buss admitted that much of what he learned about human mating "is not nice.
In the ruthless pursuit of sexual goals.., men and women derogate [sic] their
rivals, deceive members of the opposite sex, and even subvert their own mates."' 63
The discoveries, according to Buss, disturbed him: "I would prefer that the
153. Buss, supra note 148, at 18.
154. Id. at 1I. "Sexual strategies do not require conscious planning or awareness." Id. at 6.
155. Id. at 19.
156. Id. at 19-20. Women produce far fewer eggs than men produce sperm women bear the
exclusive burden of gestation and lactation.
Women are judicious, prudent, and discerning about the men they consent to mate with
because they have so many valuable reproductive resources to offer. Those with valuable
resources rarely give them away indiscriminately. The costs in reproductive currency of
failing to exercise choice were too great for ancestral women .... The benefits of choice in
nourishment, protection, and paternal investment for children were abundant.
kL at 47.
157. Id. at 20. "We still possess this underlying sexual psychology, even though our environment
has changed."
158. Id. at 23.
159. Id at 22-40.
160. Id. at50.
Why men marry poses a puzzle.... One solution to the puzzle comes from the ground rules
set by women. Since it is clear that many ancestral women required reliable signs of male
commitment before consenting to sex, men who failed to commit would have suffered
selectively on the mating market.
Id. at 49.
161. ld.at49-58.
162. Id. at 57-58.
163. Id. at 5.
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competitive, conflictual, and manipulative aspects of human mating did not
exist." 1'" Nonetheless, he recognizes that "the disturbing side of human mating
must be confronted if its harsh consequences are ever to be ameliorated."Im .
So, what can we learn about stepmothers and stepfathers from the cross-
lighting of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology? Women seek men with
resources to support their children; men, who are far more interested in casual. sex
than women, seek a woman with reproductive capacity and place emphasis upon
physical appearance.'"6 These respective goals assist in explaining why stepfathers
without the taboo of incest may sexually abuse stepchildren more often than
biological fathers; 167 and stepmothers have difficulty feeling love for their
stepchildren,'" express such sentiments as "I wanted the man, not the children,"" 9
and, most importantly, justify stepchildren's fear of the diversion of resources to
her children. 70 After all it was tension between a second wife and the adult
children of her wealthyhusband's first marriage terminated by divorce that assured
the repeal of forced heirship in Louisiana.' 7' Hence, "it is in the best interest of
164. Id. "Conflict. competition, and manipulation also pervade human mating .. " Id. at 18.Not only do men compete for mates, but competition among women although less violent "pervades
human mating systems." Id. at 9.
165. Id. at 5.
166. Id. at 73-96.
167. "Again the issue of biology comes to bear on this discussion. Daly and Wilson report that
abusive stepparents are highly discriminant as the stepchildren suffer the brunt of abuse and the
biological children am often spawd." Stanton. supra note 149, at 154.
168. See supra notes 143-159.
169. See Wallerstein & Lewis, supra note 83.
170. "In agreement with Popenoe's biosocial argument, Margo Wilson and Martin Daly of
McMasters University in Ontario explain that stepparents parent less effectively, not because they do
not know what to do; ratherjust the opposite. They know what to do. but they don't have the internal
motivation because they don't receive the same emotional rewards from their stepchildren as biological
parents do." Stanton. supra note 149, at 153.
See also U.S. News & World Rep., supra note 134. The observation of Stephanie Coontz about
historical stepmother/stepfamilies reminds us most pertinently:
[Tlhese stepfamilies were often plagued by feuds, divorces, and even murders-not
infrequently because of competition over inheritance. In societies like those of medieval
Europe. she says. where primogeniture ruled inheritance, "it makes sense for people to be
obsessed with wicked stepmothers who might try to substitute their own (often older)
children for the oldest biological child of the dad."
Id. at 62 (emphasis added). Primogeniture may not be at stake, but the husband's resources are.
171. See Cynthia Samuel, supra note 92, at 185. As Professor Samuel explains, the wealthy
couple hired a lobbyist to procure the two-thirds vote of the legislature required of a constitutional
amendment and financed a campaign for repeal which included organization and advertising.
She also commented that despite an amendment in 1982 to permit a stepparent the usufruct over the
legitime of children of the decedent's first marriage, "pressure to abolish forced heirship continued for
various societal reasons. The chief reason. in my opinion, was that divorce and remarriage had caused
many parents to become estranged from the children of their earlier marriages. These parents wished
to leave everything to the current spouse and the children of their current marriages." Id. at 184.
In Beyond the Grave the Condons who are California estate planners, thus from a common lawjurisdiction without forced heirship, list the four reasons why a testator should not rely on his second
wife's promise "to do the right thing" by the testator's children of a former marriage: "I. She Feels No
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individuals and society to work diligently to preserve first marriages and to secure
the incomparable benefits that institution brings;'" the truth is "that the benefits
of marriage for adults and children are not likely to be recovered in remarriage.""'
Consider who repeats as the storyteller the tales of the wicked stepmother,
such as Cinderella and Snow White-children's mothers: "It's not hard to imagine
why mothers might prefer tales whose subtext runs: 'Remember, my dears, that the
worst thing imaginable would be for me to disappear and for your father to replace
me with another woman."' The more likely explanation for such repeated tales,
which "lilf a story is to persist through the ages... it must serve some social
purpose....,, 74 is as a warning to her own children, understanding well a mother's
impulse to assure resources for her own children. Just because women, including
stepmothers, possess this natural impulse, does not mean that these aspects of
human behavior can not and should not be ameliorated: "Judgments of what should
exist rest with people's value systems, not with science [such as socio biology or
evolutionary psychology] or with what currently exists.... All behavior patterns
can in principle be altered by environmental intervention."''" The question is,
should they be altered; should there be constraints imposed on these natural
impulses?
B. Constitutional Parameters
Just as the constitutional parameters of the new forced heirship were critical
for resolving the legal fate of disinherison, the same inquiry assists in evaluating
the constitutionality of legislation that extends the stepparent's usufruct over the
legitime intended for the vulnerable, needy child's support."7 6 By the use of
Moral Obligation", "2. She Has No Loyalty to the First Children"- and "4. Her Children Pressured
Her to Change Her Mind."
172. Glenn T. Stanton, Why Marriage Matters: Reasons to Believe in Marriage in Postmodern
Society 158 (1997). In Chapter 5, entitled "Shattering the Myth: The Broken Promises of Divorce and
Remarriage." Stanton reviews all of the social science literature on remariage and stepfamilies at 143-
58.
173. Id. at 157.
174. Id.
175. Buss, supra note 148. at 17.
176. La. Civ. Code arts. 890. 1499.
During the 1999 legislative session. two bills, Senate Bill No. 594 and House Bill No. 466. were
introduced which would have eliminated the stepparent's usufruct over the legitime under both Civil
Code articles 890 and 1499. Senate Bill No. 594 passed the Senate but the legislature adjourned
without the bill being heard in the committee to which it was referred. House Civil Law and Procedure
Committee.
The substance of the amendments to the existing articles consisted of the following:
Louisiana Civil Code article 890 would be amended to provide:
If the usufruct affects the rights of descendants other than issue of the marriage between the
decedent and the surviving spouse, security may be requested by these descendants.
B. Nevertheless. if the descendants aem not issue of the marriage between the decedent
and the surviving spouse and are forced heirs, the usufruct shall not extend to their legitime,
except as hereafter provided. If satisfaction of the descendants' legitime would require the
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mandatory language the legislature is directed to provide that descendants of the
first degree twenty-three years of age or younger be forced heirs and is permitted
to fix the amount "[s]ubject to and not inconsistent with" the institution's basic
precepts.'" The "core principle" of the new forced heirship includes:
effective provision of support for needy incapable children .... which
combats the evil of unjust disinherison of such children, relieves the
people collectively of the responsibility of maintaining such children
through the use of public funds, and provides certainty as to the amount
(a sum certain) which has the effect of reducing litigation and
encouraging settlement.'
The usufruct granted to a stepparent by the law7 9 or the testator' s' falls within the
legislature's discretion to fix the amount of the legitime; but is it "inconsistent
with" the new forced heirship's basic precepts?
C. Unconstitutionality of Stepparent Usufruct
If the basic precept of the "core principle" of forced heirship for children
under twenty-four 8' is effective provision of support for needy children, the
sale of the family home which is subject to the usufruct of the surviving spouse and the
extent of the impingement on the legitime is less than one-quarter of the value of the
legitime, the usufruct shall be permitted.
(This entire provision is new).
Louisiana Civil Code article 1499 also would be amended to read:
A. The decedent may grant a usufruct to the surviving spouse over all or part of his
property, including the forced portion except as hereafter provided... C. The decedent
may not grant a usufruct over the legitime to the surviving spouse who is not the parent of
the forced heir, except as hereafter provided. If satisfaction of the descendant's legitime
would require the sale of the family home which is subject to the usufruct of the surviving
spouse and the extent of the impingement on the legitime is less than one-quarter of the
value of the legitime, the usufruct shall be permitted.
(italicized portion is new.)
See L Paul Hood, Jr., Forced Heirship-Spousal Usufructs, in Estate Planner 1329 (1999):
I also don't disagree with the intended purpose of the bills [Senate Bill No. 594 and House
Bill No. 447). However, based upon my professional experience and study, SB 594 actually
will impede and negatively impact familial relations. Enactment of SB 594 is more likely
to result in the vast majority of stepchildren who are not forced heirs receiving less, while
not providing the benefits to forced heirs sought by the bill.
This statement represents a portion of Mr. Hood's prepared testimony that was to be presented before
the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure and is reproduced in its entirety on the pages of the
Estate Planner that follow.
177. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 23-26.
178. See supra text accompanying note 32.
179. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
180. Louisiana Civil Code article 1499, which permits the testator to grant greater rights to the
stepparent surviving spouse than the law would since the testator is permitted to give the surviving
spouse the power to dispose of non-consumables.
181. See La. Civ. Codeart. 1493(D).
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stepparent usufruct is inherently inconsistent. 2 The usufructuary owns the civil
and natural fruits"s3 of the property comprising the legitime, and the parent-testator
may even grant the usufructuary the power to dispose of nonconsumables.' 5
Hence, the fruits produced from the legitime that could be used to support the
forced heir belong to a stepparent, who neither possesses the natural affection,
especially if the prior marriage ended by divorce, nor owes a legal obligation to
support the child. Without the ability of the forced heir to use the income produced
from the legitime for his support because it belongs to another, the legislature
exercised its discretion in fixing an amount for his legitime by burdening it with a
usufruct that is "inconsistent with" the basic precept of forced heirship--effective
provision of support for young, vulnerable, needy children. Therefore, to the
extent that Louisiana Civil Code articles 890 and 1499 provide, or permit the
testator to provide, a usufruct for the stepparent over a forced heir's legitime, the
articles are unconstitutional.'
182. Of course, before January 1. 1996. the stepparent usufruct, not to mention the parental
usufruct, of the surviving spouse did not violate the constitutional protection afforded to forced heirs
for the reason that the "core principle" of forced heirship was significantly different from its present
purpose. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 27-32.
A similar argument about unconstitutionality of legislation violative of the "core principle" of forced
heirship could have been made about Civil Code article 1501 had it not been repealed in 1997. That
Article provided for the imputation of lifetime gifts made to the forced heir who seeks reduction of
excessive donations even though to calculate his legitime the legislation only includes donations made
by the decedent within three years of his death. Jurisprudence and doctrine recognized the defense of
imputation as "defensive collation"; thus, all donees were permitted to require the heir to impute gifts
made by the decedent, coextensive with the historical obligation of forced heirs to collate. By retaining
the law of collation in 1995, the legislature implicitly retained the coextensive "defensive collation."
or imputation; yet, at the same time, enacted Article 1501 on recommendation of the Louisiana State
Law Institute. The new Article created a statutory defense of imputation and dealt far more harshly with
the forced heir who sought reduction. Because the evident purpose of Article 1501 was not the notion
of fairness to the legatee but instead an indirect method of denying the forced heir the legitime
mandated by the Louisiana Constitution, the legislature was fixing the amount of the forced heirs
legitime in Article 1501. by means of a defense, in a manner "inconsistent with" the "core principle"
of the new forced heirship.
With the subsequent repeal of Article 1501 in 1997, "defensive collation," or imputation coextensive
with the law of collation, remains if the defense is consistent with the purpose to be served by the new
forced heirship. In fact, "defensive collation" developed as a corollary to the notion that a child who
had received gifts from the decedent as an advance on his inheritance could not claim an additional
amount from the decedent's reconstituted estate-a form of double-dipping. After January, 1996,
however, the "core principle" of the legitime reserved for children under eighteen (assumed by the law
to be vulnerable and in need) is to provide an effective source of future support. Yet, the defense
imputation in effect denies the child that source of support by crediting gifts to a child's legitime
received by him within three years of the decedent's death without inquiry as to whether the property
given is still owned by the child. Obviously, if the property given has been consumed by the child, it
can not provide for his future support and the defense serves to defeat the basic precept of the new
forced heirship.
183. La. Civ. Code arts. 550-51.
184. La. Civ. Codeart. 1499.
185. By contrast, a usufruct under the same Louisiana Civil Code articles afforded to a biological
parent of the forced heir should not be unconstitutional. The biological parent owes his child under
eighteen the duty of support. See La. Civ. Code arts. 227, 230; La. R.S. 9:315.22 (1994). Even though
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The effect of the stepparent usufruct on the legitime of forced heirs must be
distinguished from legislation entirely consistent with the "core concept" of the
new forced heirship. Act No. 967 of 1999 amended the provision of the trust code
that imposes certain conditions upon a decedent's placing the legitime in trust."
Rather than requiring the net income accruing to the forced heir to be paid to him
not less than once a year, the provision now gives the trustee authority, taking into
account all of the other income and support the forced heir receives "during the
year," to distribute "funds from the net income in trust sufficient for the health,
maintenance, support, and education of the forced heir."' 7 The statutory change
eliminating the requirement that all of the income from the legitime be distributed
to the forced heir at least once a year is nonetheless entirely consistent with
assuring that the forced heir, a child under twenty-four or permanently incapable
of caring for himself or administering his property, receive funds sufficient for his
health, maintenance, support and education. Considering the lack of maturity or
capacity of these two categories of vulnerable and needy children, repealing the
requirement that all income be distributed to the forced heir seems imminently
wise, as long as the forced heir is assured a sum sufficient for his support, the
legislation implies, once a year. In fact this 1999 statutory change recognizes that
the purpose of forced heirship has changed and that the "core concept" of the new
forced heirship differs radically from that of the old when all descendants
regardless of age or capacity were forced heirs.
D. Stepparent Usufruct Defeats Purpose of Legitime for
Permanently Incapable
Although the legislature is permitted and not mandated to provide that
incapable children are forced heirs,"' it is reasonable to conclude that the people
of Louisiana assumed that such children would be constitutionally protected from
disinheritance by their parents.' 9 The situation of the legitime of permanently
a mutual obligatign of ascendants and descendants to support each other continues after age eighteen,
the obligation is limited and requires the descendant to prove need and his inability to provide forhimself. La. Civ. Code art. 229. For an interesting application of the Article in the context of disabled
children, see In re Tutorship of Blanque, 700 So. 2d 1077 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, it
seems to the author that the legislature is reasonable in assuming that a biological parent possesses
natural affection for the child which would motivate the expenditure of income produced from thelegitime on behalf of the child. Should a parent fail to provide for the child's support from the income
of the legitime the child, or someone on his behalf, can always enforce the parent's obligation of
support.
186. La. R.S. 9:1841() (1991).
187. Id.:
The legitime or any portion thereof may be placed in trust provided:(I) The trustee after taking into account all of the other income and support to be
received by the forced heir during the year shall distribute to the forced heir, or to the legal
guardian of the forced heir. funds from the net income in trust sufficient for the health
maintenance, support, and education of the forced heir.
188. For text of constitutional provision, see supra note 21.
189. See discussion in text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
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incapable children subject to the surviving spouse's usufruct differs
constitutionally, but not practically, from the situation of children under twenty-
four. In fact the position of the adult incapable children, who may be older than the
stepparent,"90 may be more perilous than that of children under twenty-four. Such
children are less likely to have been survived by a stepparent and thus subject to her
usufruct. Furthermore, the incapable child may suffer more immediate need for
support than the child under twenty-four, a need that will continue into the
indefinite future. Support for the incapable child, if not satisfied by the legitime,
will in all likelihood have to be provided from state resources at the taxpayers'
expense. To conclude, it is reasonable to predict that a usufruct afforded a
stepparent over the legitime of a forced heir will most often adversely affect the
permanently incapable child of the decedent, and the potential adverse effect on
that child and scarce state resources can be devastating.
Consider the stepparent of an incapable adult child who is the usufructuary of
the child's legitime. The usufruct entitles the stepparent to all of the income
produced from the property without any responsibility to account at termination of
the usufruct because the usufructuary owns the income. If the testator granted the
usufruct in his testament, he may also have given the usufructuary the right to
dispose of non-consumables, such as immovable property.' 9' The stepparent does
have a duty to account for the property sold, but the obligation arises only at
termination of the usufruct. If the usufruct happens to terminate upon the death of
the usufructuary, the stepparent may be younger than the incapable adult child, thus
effectively depriving the adult child throughout his life of any support. Why
should the stepparent, who feels no natural affection for the incapable adult child
and in fact may feel hostility towards him,"1 share the income from the usufruct
with the child, whom the state of Louisiana must otherwise support? The
stepparent owes no legal obligation to support the stepchild so there is no
mechanism to compel her to contribute to his support.
Some estate planners whose goal of minimizing federal estate taxes outweighs
other considerations object to any partial elimination of the usufruct of the
surviving spouse, even if limited to a stepparent." 3 A lifetime usufruct (or the
equivalent) qualifies for the QTIP marital deduction that serves as a mechanism to
reduce the federal estate tax presently payable on the decedent's estate.'" The
QTIP marital deduction, however, serves only to postpone, not eliminate, federal
estate tax liability. Ultimately, upon the death of the surviving spouse, taxes which
190. This fact is extremely important when the usufruct terminates at the death of the usufructuary,
which occurs in the case of the legal usufruct under Louisiana Civil Code article 890 if the surviving
spouse does not remarry prior to death and, even more significantly, under Louisiana Civil Code article
1499 if the testator does not expressly limit the usufruct to some time period or event other than death.
191. La. Civ.Codeart. 1499.
192. Now that the biological parent of the child is dead, there is no reason to disguise, if there ever
was a reason, the stepparent's feelings toward the child.
193. The proposal concerns only eliminating the usufruct over the legitime, not other property of
the decdent.
194. 26 U.S.C. J 2056 (1995).
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were postponed upon the death of the decedent, are due. Thus, the effect of
eliminating the stepparent usufruct would be that the estate would have to pay some
tax when the first spouse dies, rather than paying all estate taxes when the
surviving spouse dies. In other words, the change would affect the timing of the
payment of the tax, but not the obligation ultimately to pay the tax. Furthermore,
with the current exemption from estate tax liability ($675,000) which will rise to
$1,000,000 in 2006,'9' the decedent can bequeath a forced heir his legitime of one-
quarter' n tax-free, if equal to or less than the exemption, and then bequeath the rest
to his spouse, which will qualify for the marital deduction. As a consequence, no
taxes will be owed by the decedent's estate in such a scenario unless the estate is
larger than $2,700,000 (2000) or $4,000,000 (by 2006), in which case the legitime
will exceed the exemption. Conclusion: Only in the case of a decedent with a
very large estate (in excess of four million dollars by 2006), a permanently
incapable child, and a surviving spouse who is a stepparent of the child would
his estate be required to pay estate taxes sooner rather than later."9
Balancing the interests of the few very wealthy in Louisiana who desire to
postpone the payment of taxes against the plight of the permanently incapable
forced heir who is at the mercy of his stepparent, the law should protect the forced
heir. Estate tax problems of the very wealthy should not drive the policy of
Louisiana concerning those in need of protection; the complaints about the estate
tax should be addressed to Congress which has the power to completely eliminate
the tax. From the standpoint of state policy, when the forced heir is an incapable
adult child and the law creates or permits a stepparent a usufruct over his legitime,
the usufruct destroys the "core concept" of the new forced heirship; and it
frustrates the will of the people of Louisiana who conceived of forced heirship as
a legal means of conserving scarce public resources for the needy by procuring
some of those resources from the needy child's own deceased parent. The
legislature should not assume that in all cases the surviving spouse who is the
usufructuary will generously provide support for the needy adult child. If the
surviving spouse is a usufructuary and also a stepparent, the law's assumptions
according to social science empiricism prove unreasonable.
V. CONCLUSION
The new forced heirship, a truncated version of the old, continues to evolve
and necessitate a more thorough examination of related statutes reenacted in 1996
without substantial change. Understanding the history of the institution and the
"core concept" of the new forced heirship are vital as a preliminary step to
examining the interrelated provisions of succession law, such as undue influence.
Without carefully considering what statutory provisions were consistent with the
195. 26 U.S.C. § 2010(1995).
196. La. Civ. Code art. 1495.
197. The predicted number of estates in Louisiana above one million dollars by the year 2000 is
only 495 (value based on 1990 dollars). Thomas J. Stanley & William D. Danko, The Millionaire Next
Door 218 (1996).
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"core concept" of the new forced heirship, the legislature failed to assure that the
purpose of providing support to these vulnerable children was actually served.
Disinherison of the forced heir by his parent and the usufruct of a stepparent over
the legitime, considering both sociology and evolutionary psychology, preclude
accomplishing the objective intended by the new forced heirship. Disinherison,
fortunately, was repealed by the legislature; but to the extent that the Louisiana
Constitution does not prohibit it, the specter of the stepparent usufruct continues
to effectively thwart support for the forced heir.
Professor Thomas Oldham theorizes that despite generations of commentators'
criticisms of American inheritance law that fails to protect children from
disinheritance by their parents"' state legislatures have not responded. The reasons
he believes are that "American parents need a threat of disinheritance because the
American parent-child bond generally is weaker than that in other countries ... "; I"
"the right to disinherit also gives American parents substantial potential power over
the lives of their children after a parent's death, if a parent chooses to exercise
it.... ;"' and "a reflection of American resistance to government control....",0'
In summary, it may be appropriate to characterize these reasons as "the extreme
individualism of American culture." °2' None of these suggested reasons after
examination and reflection prove noble-a weaker parent-child bond because of
the proliferation of divorce, remarriage and illegitimacy; the natural yet destructive
human desire to control other people, even those one should love
198. See authorities cited in J. Thomas Oldham, What Does the U.S. System Regarding
Inheritance Rights of Children Reveal about American Families? 33 Fam. L Q. 265, 266-67 n.9
(1999). See also Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand
Alone? 57 La. L Rev. 1 (1996); Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional
Family, 1996 Utah L Rev. 93; Tamara York. Protecting Minor Children From Parental
Disinheritance: A ProposalforAwarding A Compulsory Share of the Parental Estate, 1997 Det. C.L
Mich. St. U. L Rev. 861 (1997).
In virtually every article that urges adoption of a system of protected inheritance for children the
authors recognize that it is divorce and remarriage that necessitates a reevaluation of the American
system. For example, Deborah A. Batts in I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American Law of
Disinheritance and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 Hastings L J.
1197, 1269-70 (1990), observed:
The modem phenomena of multiple marriages and divorces, statutory protections for some
family members but not others, and limited rsources of parents of multiple families tip the
balance in favor of protected inheritance for children at the expense of the romantic theory
of testamentary freedom, which is already besieged by prior public policy restrictions. It is
time for the state legislatures to champion the "tails" side of the two-sided coin of
inheritance.
199. Oldham, supra note 198, at 272.
200. Id. at 273. (emphasis added). Later in the same article, Professor Oldham opines:
Another explanation could stem from American views toward old age. While older people
in some other societies are respected as elders, American popular culture tends to view older
people as objects of derision. It is possible that American parents may perceive that they
need the right of disinheritance as a means to maintain respect within the family.
Id. at 275.
201. Id. at 273.
202. Id. at 274.
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unconditionally; 3 and the desire for no constraints on one's behavior regardless
of who that behavior affects or hurts. Should Professor Oldham be correct in his
assumptions about the reasons for refusal to provide a system of protected
inheritance for American children, the reasons themselves reveal the type of
characteristic human behavior law should constrain, in the case of protected
inheritance for children, in the interest of a parent's own children.'
Fortunately, Louisiana because of its legal heritage grounded in thousands of
years of human experience and in the principles of natural law still provides a
system of protected inheritance, albeit diminished in breadth.' It is a legacy of
which the citizens of Louisiana should be justly proud20 and should guard with
renewed resistance from the influence of other American states, particularly
considering the reasons postulated which underlie their choice not to provide a
humane, just system to protect vulnerable children from their own parents.
203. For a curent pop culture example, see Trust Me. Baby: The House, the Money -it'll All Be
Yours; There's Just One Thing, The Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1999, at Al.
204. "We may well say that the American form of democratic or republican government owes
much to the Christian conviction that human beings are not merely fallible, but fallen, and require much
watching to be kept out of serious trouble: this is what is called the First or Political Use of the Law.
namely as a curb to sin (I Tim. 1:8-10)." (emphasis added). Harold O.J. Brown, Unfettered
Individualism, 16 The Religion & Soc'y Rep. 1, 3 (Sept. 1999).
205. See Kathryn V. Lorio, supra note 5.
206. In recognition of Louisiana's distinguished legal heritage. Governor MJ. "Mike" Foster
proclaimed November 1999, as Louisiana Civil Law Month. Included within the introductory
"whereas" clauses were the following:
WHEREAS, the civilian tradition of law is a part of Louisiana's precious cultural
heritage; and
WHEREAS, the civilian tradition was established in Louisiana nearly three centuries ago
and is recognized as being based on esteemed principles of law and reason; and
WHEREAS, the civilian tradition of Louisiana's legal system is unique among the 50
states of the United States of America; and
WHEREAS, the esteemed principles of law and reason that form the civilian tradition am
embodied in the Louisiana Civil Code dating back to its first edition in 1808....
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